A signed network perspective on the government formation process in parliamentary democracies
Abstract In parliamentary democracies, government negotiations talks following a general election can sometimes be a long and laborious process. In order to explain this phenomenon, in this paper we use structural balance theory to represent a multiparty parliament as a signed network, with edge sig...
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| Auteurs principaux: | , |
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| Format: | article |
| Langue: | EN |
| Publié: |
Nature Portfolio
2021
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| Accès en ligne: | https://doaj.org/article/f56f426196f74e17bfa65ea715ad5abc |
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| Résumé: | Abstract In parliamentary democracies, government negotiations talks following a general election can sometimes be a long and laborious process. In order to explain this phenomenon, in this paper we use structural balance theory to represent a multiparty parliament as a signed network, with edge signs representing alliances and rivalries among parties. We show that the notion of frustration, which quantifies the amount of “disorder” encoded in the signed graph, correlates very well with the duration of the government negotiation talks. For the 29 European countries considered in this study, the average correlation between frustration and government negotiation talks ranges between 0.42 and 0.69, depending on what information is included in the edges of the signed network. Dynamical models of collective decision-making over signed networks with varying frustration are proposed to explain this correlation. |
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