From the phenomenology to the mechanisms of consciousness: Integrated Information Theory 3.0.

This paper presents Integrated Information Theory (IIT) of consciousness 3.0, which incorporates several advances over previous formulations. IIT starts from phenomenological axioms: information says that each experience is specific--it is what it is by how it differs from alternative experiences; i...

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Autores principales: Masafumi Oizumi, Larissa Albantakis, Giulio Tononi
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Publicado: Public Library of Science (PLoS) 2014
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Acceso en línea:https://doaj.org/article/f58a20b8ee0143ddb41986c97033d083
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spelling oai:doaj.org-article:f58a20b8ee0143ddb41986c97033d0832021-11-18T05:52:53ZFrom the phenomenology to the mechanisms of consciousness: Integrated Information Theory 3.0.1553-734X1553-735810.1371/journal.pcbi.1003588https://doaj.org/article/f58a20b8ee0143ddb41986c97033d0832014-05-01T00:00:00Zhttps://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/pmid/24811198/pdf/?tool=EBIhttps://doaj.org/toc/1553-734Xhttps://doaj.org/toc/1553-7358This paper presents Integrated Information Theory (IIT) of consciousness 3.0, which incorporates several advances over previous formulations. IIT starts from phenomenological axioms: information says that each experience is specific--it is what it is by how it differs from alternative experiences; integration says that it is unified--irreducible to non-interdependent components; exclusion says that it has unique borders and a particular spatio-temporal grain. These axioms are formalized into postulates that prescribe how physical mechanisms, such as neurons or logic gates, must be configured to generate experience (phenomenology). The postulates are used to define intrinsic information as "differences that make a difference" within a system, and integrated information as information specified by a whole that cannot be reduced to that specified by its parts. By applying the postulates both at the level of individual mechanisms and at the level of systems of mechanisms, IIT arrives at an identity: an experience is a maximally irreducible conceptual structure (MICS, a constellation of concepts in qualia space), and the set of elements that generates it constitutes a complex. According to IIT, a MICS specifies the quality of an experience and integrated information ΦMax its quantity. From the theory follow several results, including: a system of mechanisms may condense into a major complex and non-overlapping minor complexes; the concepts that specify the quality of an experience are always about the complex itself and relate only indirectly to the external environment; anatomical connectivity influences complexes and associated MICS; a complex can generate a MICS even if its elements are inactive; simple systems can be minimally conscious; complicated systems can be unconscious; there can be true "zombies"--unconscious feed-forward systems that are functionally equivalent to conscious complexes.Masafumi OizumiLarissa AlbantakisGiulio TononiPublic Library of Science (PLoS)articleBiology (General)QH301-705.5ENPLoS Computational Biology, Vol 10, Iss 5, p e1003588 (2014)
institution DOAJ
collection DOAJ
language EN
topic Biology (General)
QH301-705.5
spellingShingle Biology (General)
QH301-705.5
Masafumi Oizumi
Larissa Albantakis
Giulio Tononi
From the phenomenology to the mechanisms of consciousness: Integrated Information Theory 3.0.
description This paper presents Integrated Information Theory (IIT) of consciousness 3.0, which incorporates several advances over previous formulations. IIT starts from phenomenological axioms: information says that each experience is specific--it is what it is by how it differs from alternative experiences; integration says that it is unified--irreducible to non-interdependent components; exclusion says that it has unique borders and a particular spatio-temporal grain. These axioms are formalized into postulates that prescribe how physical mechanisms, such as neurons or logic gates, must be configured to generate experience (phenomenology). The postulates are used to define intrinsic information as "differences that make a difference" within a system, and integrated information as information specified by a whole that cannot be reduced to that specified by its parts. By applying the postulates both at the level of individual mechanisms and at the level of systems of mechanisms, IIT arrives at an identity: an experience is a maximally irreducible conceptual structure (MICS, a constellation of concepts in qualia space), and the set of elements that generates it constitutes a complex. According to IIT, a MICS specifies the quality of an experience and integrated information ΦMax its quantity. From the theory follow several results, including: a system of mechanisms may condense into a major complex and non-overlapping minor complexes; the concepts that specify the quality of an experience are always about the complex itself and relate only indirectly to the external environment; anatomical connectivity influences complexes and associated MICS; a complex can generate a MICS even if its elements are inactive; simple systems can be minimally conscious; complicated systems can be unconscious; there can be true "zombies"--unconscious feed-forward systems that are functionally equivalent to conscious complexes.
format article
author Masafumi Oizumi
Larissa Albantakis
Giulio Tononi
author_facet Masafumi Oizumi
Larissa Albantakis
Giulio Tononi
author_sort Masafumi Oizumi
title From the phenomenology to the mechanisms of consciousness: Integrated Information Theory 3.0.
title_short From the phenomenology to the mechanisms of consciousness: Integrated Information Theory 3.0.
title_full From the phenomenology to the mechanisms of consciousness: Integrated Information Theory 3.0.
title_fullStr From the phenomenology to the mechanisms of consciousness: Integrated Information Theory 3.0.
title_full_unstemmed From the phenomenology to the mechanisms of consciousness: Integrated Information Theory 3.0.
title_sort from the phenomenology to the mechanisms of consciousness: integrated information theory 3.0.
publisher Public Library of Science (PLoS)
publishDate 2014
url https://doaj.org/article/f58a20b8ee0143ddb41986c97033d083
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