Cavell and Philosophical Vertigo
My interest is the kind of philosophical vertigo that is a theme of Cavell’s work on scepticism. This describes the anxiety that is elicited via philosophical engagement with certain kinds of sceptical questions (e.g., rule-following, other minds, external world scepticism). There is a standing puz...
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| Formato: | article |
| Lenguaje: | EN |
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MULPress
2021
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| Acceso en línea: | https://doaj.org/article/f6c1e9ce9a1c4af880676f4f47369bfe |
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| Sumario: | My interest is the kind of philosophical vertigo that is a theme of Cavell’s work on scepticism. This describes the anxiety that is elicited via philosophical engagement with certain kinds of sceptical questions (e.g., rule-following, other minds, external world scepticism). There is a standing puzzle about this notion of vertigo, however, forcefully pressed, for example, by McDowell. Why should a resolution of the sceptical problem, one that putatively completely undercuts the motivation for scepticism in that domain, nonetheless generate vertigo in this sense? I aim to resolve the puzzle, in a way that I believe underwrites this Cavellian notion, via consideration of Wittgenstein’s remarks on the structure of rational evaluation in his final notebooks, published as On Certainty.
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