Cavell and Philosophical Vertigo
My interest is the kind of philosophical vertigo that is a theme of Cavell’s work on scepticism. This describes the anxiety that is elicited via philosophical engagement with certain kinds of sceptical questions (e.g., rule-following, other minds, external world scepticism). There is a standing puz...
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2021
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oai:doaj.org-article:f6c1e9ce9a1c4af880676f4f47369bfe2021-11-07T13:00:32ZCavell and Philosophical Vertigo10.15173/jhap.v9i9.49142159-0303https://doaj.org/article/f6c1e9ce9a1c4af880676f4f47369bfe2021-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://jhaponline.org/jhap/article/view/4914https://doaj.org/toc/2159-0303 My interest is the kind of philosophical vertigo that is a theme of Cavell’s work on scepticism. This describes the anxiety that is elicited via philosophical engagement with certain kinds of sceptical questions (e.g., rule-following, other minds, external world scepticism). There is a standing puzzle about this notion of vertigo, however, forcefully pressed, for example, by McDowell. Why should a resolution of the sceptical problem, one that putatively completely undercuts the motivation for scepticism in that domain, nonetheless generate vertigo in this sense? I aim to resolve the puzzle, in a way that I believe underwrites this Cavellian notion, via consideration of Wittgenstein’s remarks on the structure of rational evaluation in his final notebooks, published as On Certainty. Duncan PritchardMULPressarticlePhilosophy (General)B1-5802ENJournal for the History of Analytical Philosophy, Vol 9, Iss 9 (2021) |
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Philosophy (General) B1-5802 |
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Philosophy (General) B1-5802 Duncan Pritchard Cavell and Philosophical Vertigo |
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My interest is the kind of philosophical vertigo that is a theme of Cavell’s work on scepticism. This describes the anxiety that is elicited via philosophical engagement with certain kinds of sceptical questions (e.g., rule-following, other minds, external world scepticism). There is a standing puzzle about this notion of vertigo, however, forcefully pressed, for example, by McDowell. Why should a resolution of the sceptical problem, one that putatively completely undercuts the motivation for scepticism in that domain, nonetheless generate vertigo in this sense? I aim to resolve the puzzle, in a way that I believe underwrites this Cavellian notion, via consideration of Wittgenstein’s remarks on the structure of rational evaluation in his final notebooks, published as On Certainty.
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| format |
article |
| author |
Duncan Pritchard |
| author_facet |
Duncan Pritchard |
| author_sort |
Duncan Pritchard |
| title |
Cavell and Philosophical Vertigo |
| title_short |
Cavell and Philosophical Vertigo |
| title_full |
Cavell and Philosophical Vertigo |
| title_fullStr |
Cavell and Philosophical Vertigo |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Cavell and Philosophical Vertigo |
| title_sort |
cavell and philosophical vertigo |
| publisher |
MULPress |
| publishDate |
2021 |
| url |
https://doaj.org/article/f6c1e9ce9a1c4af880676f4f47369bfe |
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