From “Onion Not Found” to Guard Discovery
We present a novel web-based attack that identifies a Tor user’s guard in a matter of seconds. Our attack is low-cost, fast, and stealthy. It requires only a moderate amount of resources and can be deployed by website owners, third-party script providers, and malicious exits—if the website traffic i...
Guardado en:
Autores principales: | Oldenburg Lennart, Acar Gunes, Diaz Claudia |
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Formato: | article |
Lenguaje: | EN |
Publicado: |
Sciendo
2022
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://doaj.org/article/f739fe0bc24b4a4694f11dc6cdfa266d |
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