Populism, Constitution Making, and the Rule of Law in Latin America

<span class="abs_content">The article explores the effects of populist polarization in creating strong and long-lasting institutions based on the rule of law. It focuses on politics and not on the political economy of populism or of natural resource extraction. The first section brie...

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Autores principales:	Carlos de la Torre, Felipe Burbano de Lara
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Coordinamento SIBA 2020
Materias:	chávez correa latin america left populism morales peronism Political science (General) JA1-92
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/f84907f20e4c41f48e3d944318a76f91
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:f84907f20e4c41f48e3d944318a76f912021-11-21T15:11:42ZPopulism, Constitution Making, and the Rule of Law in Latin America1972-76232035-660910.1285/i20356609v13i3p1453https://doaj.org/article/f84907f20e4c41f48e3d944318a76f912020-11-01T00:00:00Zhttp://siba-ese.unisalento.it/index.php/paco/article/view/23057https://doaj.org/toc/1972-7623https://doaj.org/toc/2035-6609<span class="abs_content">The article explores the effects of populist polarization in creating strong and long-lasting institutions based on the rule of law. It focuses on politics and not on the political economy of populism or of natural resource extraction. The first section briefly explains how we understand the contested notions of populism and the rule of law. The second focuses on the paradigmatic case of Juan Perón's first two administrations (1946-1956) to explore the ambiguous legacies of populist inclusion for the creation of long-lasting demo-cratic institutions. The third section focuses on how Hugo Chávez, Evo Morales and Rafael Correa appealed to the un-bounded will of the people to convene participatory constituent assemblies. The last section focuses on Ecuador's post-populist succession. Different from Evo Morales that was ousted by a coup, or Nicolás Maduro that killed democracy, Lenín Moreno, who was Correa's former vice-president, abandoned populism, ditched his mentor, and used a referendum to clean the state and political institutions from Correa's allies. Appealing to the people directly, his administration assumed exceptional powers to name new authorities of control and accountability. His institutional reforms however might not last because they were based on the exclusion of Correa and his followers. The conclusion explores the reasons why actors continue to use laws instrumentally making it difficult to create long-lasting institutional arrangements based on the rule of law, and hence on the possibility of deepening democracy.</span><br />Carlos de la TorreFelipe Burbano de LaraCoordinamento SIBAarticlechávezcorrealatin americaleft populismmoralesperonismPolitical science (General)JA1-92ENPartecipazione e Conflitto, Vol 13, Iss 3, Pp 1453-1468 (2020)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	chávez correa latin america left populism morales peronism Political science (General) JA1-92
spellingShingle	chávez correa latin america left populism morales peronism Political science (General) JA1-92 Carlos de la Torre Felipe Burbano de Lara Populism, Constitution Making, and the Rule of Law in Latin America
description	<span class="abs_content">The article explores the effects of populist polarization in creating strong and long-lasting institutions based on the rule of law. It focuses on politics and not on the political economy of populism or of natural resource extraction. The first section briefly explains how we understand the contested notions of populism and the rule of law. The second focuses on the paradigmatic case of Juan Perón's first two administrations (1946-1956) to explore the ambiguous legacies of populist inclusion for the creation of long-lasting demo-cratic institutions. The third section focuses on how Hugo Chávez, Evo Morales and Rafael Correa appealed to the un-bounded will of the people to convene participatory constituent assemblies. The last section focuses on Ecuador's post-populist succession. Different from Evo Morales that was ousted by a coup, or Nicolás Maduro that killed democracy, Lenín Moreno, who was Correa's former vice-president, abandoned populism, ditched his mentor, and used a referendum to clean the state and political institutions from Correa's allies. Appealing to the people directly, his administration assumed exceptional powers to name new authorities of control and accountability. His institutional reforms however might not last because they were based on the exclusion of Correa and his followers. The conclusion explores the reasons why actors continue to use laws instrumentally making it difficult to create long-lasting institutional arrangements based on the rule of law, and hence on the possibility of deepening democracy.</span><br />
format	article
author	Carlos de la Torre Felipe Burbano de Lara
author_facet	Carlos de la Torre Felipe Burbano de Lara
author_sort	Carlos de la Torre
title	Populism, Constitution Making, and the Rule of Law in Latin America
title_short	Populism, Constitution Making, and the Rule of Law in Latin America
title_full	Populism, Constitution Making, and the Rule of Law in Latin America
title_fullStr	Populism, Constitution Making, and the Rule of Law in Latin America
title_full_unstemmed	Populism, Constitution Making, and the Rule of Law in Latin America
title_sort	populism, constitution making, and the rule of law in latin america
publisher	Coordinamento SIBA
publishDate	2020
url	https://doaj.org/article/f84907f20e4c41f48e3d944318a76f91
work_keys_str_mv	AT carlosdelatorre populismconstitutionmakingandtheruleoflawinlatinamerica AT felipeburbanodelara populismconstitutionmakingandtheruleoflawinlatinamerica
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Populism, Constitution Making, and the Rule of Law in Latin America

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