How collective reward structure impedes group decision making: An experimental study using the HoneyComb paradigm.

This study investigates if and under which conditions humans are able to identify and follow the most advantageous leader who will them provide with the most resources. In an iterated economic game with the aim of earning monetary reward, 150 participants were asked to repeatedly choose one out of f...

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Autores principales:	Marie Ritter, Meng Wang, Johannes Pritz, Olaf Menssen, Margarete Boos
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Public Library of Science (PLoS) 2021
Materias:	Medicine R Science Q
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/f89529e8bd0143879b12a9e427006b54
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:f89529e8bd0143879b12a9e427006b542021-12-02T20:12:59ZHow collective reward structure impedes group decision making: An experimental study using the HoneyComb paradigm.1932-620310.1371/journal.pone.0259963https://doaj.org/article/f89529e8bd0143879b12a9e427006b542021-01-01T00:00:00Zhttps://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0259963https://doaj.org/toc/1932-6203This study investigates if and under which conditions humans are able to identify and follow the most advantageous leader who will them provide with the most resources. In an iterated economic game with the aim of earning monetary reward, 150 participants were asked to repeatedly choose one out of four leaders. Unbeknownst to participants, the leaders were computer-controlled and programmed to yield different expected payout values that participants had to infer from repeated interaction over 30 rounds. Additionally, participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: single, independent, or cohesion. The conditions were designed to investigate the ideal circumstances that lead to identifying the most advantageous leader: when participants are alone (single condition), in a group that lets individuals sample information about leaders independently (independent condition), or in a group that is rewarded for cohesive behavior (cohesion condition). Our results show that participants are generally able to identify the most advantageous leader. However, participants who were incentivized to act cohesively in a group were more likely to settle on a less advantageous leader. This suggests that cohesion might have a detrimental effect on group decision making. To test the validity of this finding, we explore possible explanations for this pattern, such as the length of exploration and exploitation phases, and present techniques to check for confounding factors in group experiments in order to identify or exclude them as alternative explanations. Finally, we show that the chosen reward structure of the game strongly affects the observed following behavior in the group and possibly occludes other effects. We conclude with a recommendation to carefully choose reward structures and evaluate possible alternative explanations in experimental group research that should further pursue the study of exploration/exploitation phases and the influence of group cohesion on group decision making as promising topics for further research.Marie RitterMeng WangJohannes PritzOlaf MenssenMargarete BoosPublic Library of Science (PLoS)articleMedicineRScienceQENPLoS ONE, Vol 16, Iss 11, p e0259963 (2021)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Medicine R Science Q
spellingShingle	Medicine R Science Q Marie Ritter Meng Wang Johannes Pritz Olaf Menssen Margarete Boos How collective reward structure impedes group decision making: An experimental study using the HoneyComb paradigm.
description	This study investigates if and under which conditions humans are able to identify and follow the most advantageous leader who will them provide with the most resources. In an iterated economic game with the aim of earning monetary reward, 150 participants were asked to repeatedly choose one out of four leaders. Unbeknownst to participants, the leaders were computer-controlled and programmed to yield different expected payout values that participants had to infer from repeated interaction over 30 rounds. Additionally, participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: single, independent, or cohesion. The conditions were designed to investigate the ideal circumstances that lead to identifying the most advantageous leader: when participants are alone (single condition), in a group that lets individuals sample information about leaders independently (independent condition), or in a group that is rewarded for cohesive behavior (cohesion condition). Our results show that participants are generally able to identify the most advantageous leader. However, participants who were incentivized to act cohesively in a group were more likely to settle on a less advantageous leader. This suggests that cohesion might have a detrimental effect on group decision making. To test the validity of this finding, we explore possible explanations for this pattern, such as the length of exploration and exploitation phases, and present techniques to check for confounding factors in group experiments in order to identify or exclude them as alternative explanations. Finally, we show that the chosen reward structure of the game strongly affects the observed following behavior in the group and possibly occludes other effects. We conclude with a recommendation to carefully choose reward structures and evaluate possible alternative explanations in experimental group research that should further pursue the study of exploration/exploitation phases and the influence of group cohesion on group decision making as promising topics for further research.
format	article
author	Marie Ritter Meng Wang Johannes Pritz Olaf Menssen Margarete Boos
author_facet	Marie Ritter Meng Wang Johannes Pritz Olaf Menssen Margarete Boos
author_sort	Marie Ritter
title	How collective reward structure impedes group decision making: An experimental study using the HoneyComb paradigm.
title_short	How collective reward structure impedes group decision making: An experimental study using the HoneyComb paradigm.
title_full	How collective reward structure impedes group decision making: An experimental study using the HoneyComb paradigm.
title_fullStr	How collective reward structure impedes group decision making: An experimental study using the HoneyComb paradigm.
title_full_unstemmed	How collective reward structure impedes group decision making: An experimental study using the HoneyComb paradigm.
title_sort	how collective reward structure impedes group decision making: an experimental study using the honeycomb paradigm.
publisher	Public Library of Science (PLoS)
publishDate	2021
url	https://doaj.org/article/f89529e8bd0143879b12a9e427006b54
work_keys_str_mv	AT marieritter howcollectiverewardstructureimpedesgroupdecisionmakinganexperimentalstudyusingthehoneycombparadigm AT mengwang howcollectiverewardstructureimpedesgroupdecisionmakinganexperimentalstudyusingthehoneycombparadigm AT johannespritz howcollectiverewardstructureimpedesgroupdecisionmakinganexperimentalstudyusingthehoneycombparadigm AT olafmenssen howcollectiverewardstructureimpedesgroupdecisionmakinganexperimentalstudyusingthehoneycombparadigm AT margareteboos howcollectiverewardstructureimpedesgroupdecisionmakinganexperimentalstudyusingthehoneycombparadigm
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How collective reward structure impedes group decision making: An experimental study using the HoneyComb paradigm.

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