We are all a little bit Cerberus: towards bioethical applicability of animalism

I consider the applicability of the animalism in the framework of bioethical discussions — in particular related to situations in which a person is the cause of an event that is outside of her intentions, for example, infection with a dangerous disease. Animal or living organism are more adequate...

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Autor principal: S. Yu. Shevchenko
Formato: article
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RU
Publicado: Omsk State Technical University, Federal State Budgetary Educational Institution of Higher Education 2021
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Acceso en línea:https://doaj.org/article/f9e938d43d7d440596abb6c94f2f7685
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spelling oai:doaj.org-article:f9e938d43d7d440596abb6c94f2f76852021-11-26T09:23:08ZWe are all a little bit Cerberus: towards bioethical applicability of animalism10.25206/2542-0488-2021-6-4-130-1382542-04882541-7983https://doaj.org/article/f9e938d43d7d440596abb6c94f2f76852021-12-01T00:00:00Zhttps://www.omgtu.ru/general_information/media_omgtu/journal_of_omsk_research_journal/files/arhiv/2021/%D0%A2.%206,%20%E2%84%96%204%20(%D0%9E%D0%98%D0%A1)/130-138%20%D0%A8%D0%B5%D0%B2%D1%87%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%BA%D0%BE%20%D0%A1.%20%D0%AE..pdfhttps://doaj.org/toc/2542-0488https://doaj.org/toc/2541-7983I consider the applicability of the animalism in the framework of bioethical discussions — in particular related to situations in which a person is the cause of an event that is outside of her intentions, for example, infection with a dangerous disease. Animal or living organism are more adequate concept for posing this problem than the ‘Lockean’, psychological, personality. However, the conceptualization of the animal, proposed by the most famous animalist Eric Olson, turns out to be inappropriate for the bioethical formulation of bioethical problems. I suppose that Olson’s logic striving to cleanse the animal of everything that can be recognized as not proper part of it to some extent repeats the logic of constructing a transcendental subject. At the same time, the complexity of some bioethical problems emerges due to the impossibility of relying on the concept of a transcendental subject. The figure of Cerberus, a two-headed animal, and a single agent, allows to develop an alternative interpretation of the animal (living organism), more comprehensively characterizing who is involved in bioethical collisions. The article outlines the image of a single but distributed agent. As an example of such biological (animalistic), but also cognitive (psychological) distribution, I suggest the animal’s possession of the inner and skin microbiome.S. Yu. ShevchenkoOmsk State Technical University, Federal State Budgetary Educational Institution of Higher Educationarticlebioethicsanimalismmicrobiomeextended cognitionmetaphysicspragmatismHistory (General) and history of EuropeDEconomics as a scienceHB71-74NewspapersANENRUОмский научный вестник: Серия "Общество. История. Современность", Vol 6, Iss 4, Pp 130-138 (2021)
institution DOAJ
collection DOAJ
language EN
RU
topic bioethics
animalism
microbiome
extended cognition
metaphysics
pragmatism
History (General) and history of Europe
D
Economics as a science
HB71-74
Newspapers
AN
spellingShingle bioethics
animalism
microbiome
extended cognition
metaphysics
pragmatism
History (General) and history of Europe
D
Economics as a science
HB71-74
Newspapers
AN
S. Yu. Shevchenko
We are all a little bit Cerberus: towards bioethical applicability of animalism
description I consider the applicability of the animalism in the framework of bioethical discussions — in particular related to situations in which a person is the cause of an event that is outside of her intentions, for example, infection with a dangerous disease. Animal or living organism are more adequate concept for posing this problem than the ‘Lockean’, psychological, personality. However, the conceptualization of the animal, proposed by the most famous animalist Eric Olson, turns out to be inappropriate for the bioethical formulation of bioethical problems. I suppose that Olson’s logic striving to cleanse the animal of everything that can be recognized as not proper part of it to some extent repeats the logic of constructing a transcendental subject. At the same time, the complexity of some bioethical problems emerges due to the impossibility of relying on the concept of a transcendental subject. The figure of Cerberus, a two-headed animal, and a single agent, allows to develop an alternative interpretation of the animal (living organism), more comprehensively characterizing who is involved in bioethical collisions. The article outlines the image of a single but distributed agent. As an example of such biological (animalistic), but also cognitive (psychological) distribution, I suggest the animal’s possession of the inner and skin microbiome.
format article
author S. Yu. Shevchenko
author_facet S. Yu. Shevchenko
author_sort S. Yu. Shevchenko
title We are all a little bit Cerberus: towards bioethical applicability of animalism
title_short We are all a little bit Cerberus: towards bioethical applicability of animalism
title_full We are all a little bit Cerberus: towards bioethical applicability of animalism
title_fullStr We are all a little bit Cerberus: towards bioethical applicability of animalism
title_full_unstemmed We are all a little bit Cerberus: towards bioethical applicability of animalism
title_sort we are all a little bit cerberus: towards bioethical applicability of animalism
publisher Omsk State Technical University, Federal State Budgetary Educational Institution of Higher Education
publishDate 2021
url https://doaj.org/article/f9e938d43d7d440596abb6c94f2f7685
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