STRATEGIC ENTRY DETERRENCE MODELING: LITERATURE REVIEW

The prime focus in this article is on key findings concerning theoretical aspects of strategic behavior by incumbents to deter market entry of new firms. The author summarizes main lines of scientific research in the topic which give an insight into the patterns of the incumbent’s impact on the beha...

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Autor principal:	D. A. Seliverstov
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN RU
Publicado:	MGIMO University Press 2017
Materias:	strategic behavior market entry entry deterrence limit output entry barriers sunk costs competition two-stage games entrant incumbent firm International relations JZ2-6530
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/fae63101c138436d84f7be301b2b5225
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:fae63101c138436d84f7be301b2b52252021-11-23T14:50:38ZSTRATEGIC ENTRY DETERRENCE MODELING: LITERATURE REVIEW2071-81602541-909910.24833/2071-8160-2017-5-56-209-232https://doaj.org/article/fae63101c138436d84f7be301b2b52252017-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://www.vestnik.mgimo.ru/jour/article/view/680https://doaj.org/toc/2071-8160https://doaj.org/toc/2541-9099The prime focus in this article is on key findings concerning theoretical aspects of strategic behavior by incumbents to deter market entry of new firms. The author summarizes main lines of scientific research in the topic which give an insight into the patterns of the incumbent’s impact on the behavior of the entrants, the entry deterrence instruments and the consequences of these actions.Today the free entry markets are considered to be a rare phenomenon. The market entry of new firms is associated with significant entry costs, which allow the incumbents to take advantage of their dominant position and derive positive economic profits. In case of entry threat by potential competitors the incumbents take strategic actions aimed at deterring entry and preserving their dominant position. Among the most efficient strategic actions one can emphasize the erection of additional barriers to entry for the newcomers through producing the limit output and price, investments in sunk assets, capacity expansion and product differentiation. Meanwhile by taking strategic actions the incumbents are not always trying to affect the entrant’s costs and profit directly, they often aim at changing the entrant’s expectations regarding future intentions of the incumbents to preserve dominant position.D. A. SeliverstovMGIMO University Pressarticlestrategic behaviormarket entryentry deterrencelimit outputentry barrierssunk costscompetitiontwo-stage gamesentrantincumbent firmInternational relationsJZ2-6530ENRUVestnik MGIMO-Universiteta, Vol 0, Iss 5(56), Pp 209-235 (2017)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN RU
topic	strategic behavior market entry entry deterrence limit output entry barriers sunk costs competition two-stage games entrant incumbent firm International relations JZ2-6530
spellingShingle	strategic behavior market entry entry deterrence limit output entry barriers sunk costs competition two-stage games entrant incumbent firm International relations JZ2-6530 D. A. Seliverstov STRATEGIC ENTRY DETERRENCE MODELING: LITERATURE REVIEW
description	The prime focus in this article is on key findings concerning theoretical aspects of strategic behavior by incumbents to deter market entry of new firms. The author summarizes main lines of scientific research in the topic which give an insight into the patterns of the incumbent’s impact on the behavior of the entrants, the entry deterrence instruments and the consequences of these actions.Today the free entry markets are considered to be a rare phenomenon. The market entry of new firms is associated with significant entry costs, which allow the incumbents to take advantage of their dominant position and derive positive economic profits. In case of entry threat by potential competitors the incumbents take strategic actions aimed at deterring entry and preserving their dominant position. Among the most efficient strategic actions one can emphasize the erection of additional barriers to entry for the newcomers through producing the limit output and price, investments in sunk assets, capacity expansion and product differentiation. Meanwhile by taking strategic actions the incumbents are not always trying to affect the entrant’s costs and profit directly, they often aim at changing the entrant’s expectations regarding future intentions of the incumbents to preserve dominant position.
format	article
author	D. A. Seliverstov
author_facet	D. A. Seliverstov
author_sort	D. A. Seliverstov
title	STRATEGIC ENTRY DETERRENCE MODELING: LITERATURE REVIEW
title_short	STRATEGIC ENTRY DETERRENCE MODELING: LITERATURE REVIEW
title_full	STRATEGIC ENTRY DETERRENCE MODELING: LITERATURE REVIEW
title_fullStr	STRATEGIC ENTRY DETERRENCE MODELING: LITERATURE REVIEW
title_full_unstemmed	STRATEGIC ENTRY DETERRENCE MODELING: LITERATURE REVIEW
title_sort	strategic entry deterrence modeling: literature review
publisher	MGIMO University Press
publishDate	2017
url	https://doaj.org/article/fae63101c138436d84f7be301b2b5225
work_keys_str_mv	AT daseliverstov strategicentrydeterrencemodelingliteraturereview
_version_	1718416742178357248

STRATEGIC ENTRY DETERRENCE MODELING: LITERATURE REVIEW

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