In Defence of "Belief": A Cognitive Response to Behaviourism, Eliminativism, and Social Constructivism

Kognitivna istraživanja religije pokušavaju da objasne religijska uverenja. Ipak, mnogi antropolozi, psiholozi i filozofi kritikuju koncepte "vere" ili "uverenja" kao takve. Osnovne kritike sastoje se u tome da se "uverenje" ne može posmatrati, da ne postoji, i da je sa...

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Autor principal: Jonathan A. Lanman
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Publicado: University of Belgrade 2016
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Acceso en línea:https://doaj.org/article/fd7fbe83028045dbbfd495bc4c11ab09
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spelling oai:doaj.org-article:fd7fbe83028045dbbfd495bc4c11ab092021-12-02T00:15:43ZIn Defence of "Belief": A Cognitive Response to Behaviourism, Eliminativism, and Social Constructivism0353-15892334-8801https://doaj.org/article/fd7fbe83028045dbbfd495bc4c11ab092016-03-01T00:00:00Zhttp://eap-iea.org/index.php/eap/article/view/499https://doaj.org/toc/0353-1589https://doaj.org/toc/2334-8801Kognitivna istraživanja religije pokušavaju da objasne religijska uverenja. Ipak, mnogi antropolozi, psiholozi i filozofi kritikuju koncepte "vere" ili "uverenja" kao takve. Osnovne kritike sastoje se u tome da se "uverenje" ne može posmatrati, da ne postoji, i da je sam termin zapadnjački konstrukt neupotrebljiv za poređenje. Ove kritike mogu da učine da "nauka o verovanju" deluje naivno i pogrešno. Oslanjajući se na kognitivnu nauku, i filozofski funckionalizam koji joj je u osnovi, ponudiću minimalnu definiciju verovanja koja omogućuje nauci koja se time bavi da odoli ovim kritikama.Jonathan A. LanmanUniversity of BelgradearticleAnthropologyGN1-890ENFRSREtnoantropološki Problemi, Vol 3, Iss 3, Pp 49-62 (2016)
institution DOAJ
collection DOAJ
language EN
FR
SR
topic Anthropology
GN1-890
spellingShingle Anthropology
GN1-890
Jonathan A. Lanman
In Defence of "Belief": A Cognitive Response to Behaviourism, Eliminativism, and Social Constructivism
description Kognitivna istraživanja religije pokušavaju da objasne religijska uverenja. Ipak, mnogi antropolozi, psiholozi i filozofi kritikuju koncepte "vere" ili "uverenja" kao takve. Osnovne kritike sastoje se u tome da se "uverenje" ne može posmatrati, da ne postoji, i da je sam termin zapadnjački konstrukt neupotrebljiv za poređenje. Ove kritike mogu da učine da "nauka o verovanju" deluje naivno i pogrešno. Oslanjajući se na kognitivnu nauku, i filozofski funckionalizam koji joj je u osnovi, ponudiću minimalnu definiciju verovanja koja omogućuje nauci koja se time bavi da odoli ovim kritikama.
format article
author Jonathan A. Lanman
author_facet Jonathan A. Lanman
author_sort Jonathan A. Lanman
title In Defence of "Belief": A Cognitive Response to Behaviourism, Eliminativism, and Social Constructivism
title_short In Defence of "Belief": A Cognitive Response to Behaviourism, Eliminativism, and Social Constructivism
title_full In Defence of "Belief": A Cognitive Response to Behaviourism, Eliminativism, and Social Constructivism
title_fullStr In Defence of "Belief": A Cognitive Response to Behaviourism, Eliminativism, and Social Constructivism
title_full_unstemmed In Defence of "Belief": A Cognitive Response to Behaviourism, Eliminativism, and Social Constructivism
title_sort in defence of "belief": a cognitive response to behaviourism, eliminativism, and social constructivism
publisher University of Belgrade
publishDate 2016
url https://doaj.org/article/fd7fbe83028045dbbfd495bc4c11ab09
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