THE RETURN OF NEO-PROTECTIONISM?

As a moral corrective, compliance rules may be particularly important for the internal relationships of employees in a company and for the relationships between different companies. There original purpose was to ensure correctness and fairness in day-to-day business. This article analyzes the ro...

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Autores principales:	Malte Pehl LL.M., Zwetelina Gankova-Ivanova, Franz Peter Lang
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN PL RU UK
Publicado:	Consilium LLC 2021
Materias:	compliance international trade protectionism neo-protectionism international relations discrimination Economics as a science HB71-74
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/fe9e29af08c94c939d7df8ed36bf4019
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:fe9e29af08c94c939d7df8ed36bf40192021-11-21T22:28:19ZTHE RETURN OF NEO-PROTECTIONISM?10.32070/ec.v2i50.1152449-73202545-3483https://doaj.org/article/fe9e29af08c94c939d7df8ed36bf40192021-04-01T00:00:00Zhttps://european-cooperation.eu/index.php/EC/article/view/115https://doaj.org/toc/2449-7320https://doaj.org/toc/2545-3483 As a moral corrective, compliance rules may be particularly important for the internal relationships of employees in a company and for the relationships between different companies. There original purpose was to ensure correctness and fairness in day-to-day business. This article analyzes the role of compliance rules as a non-tariff trade barrier and thus as an instrument of neo-protectionism. The analysis combines economic and legal aspects in the sense of the "institutional economics". The authors deliver a critical examination of the effects of compliance rules in the prevailing world trading system with many empirical examples. They come to the conclusion that with new, extended “Compliance Rules”, governments have an new instrument for protecting their economies by blaming foreign companies (exporters an investors) being not complying with this rules. They can use the argument of a violation of the existing rules, threaten legal sanctions or even intervene by law massively. The essay makes it clear that with a steady increase in such national regulations of entrepreneurial activity via moral aspects, a protectionist effect is achieved. This can also have a stronger impact on the own domestic economy than on the foreign trade and can be directed against its operators Malte Pehl LL.M.Zwetelina Gankova-IvanovaFranz Peter LangConsilium LLCarticlecomplianceinternational tradeprotectionismneo-protectionisminternational relationsdiscriminationEconomics as a scienceHB71-74ENPLRUUKEuropean Cooperation, Vol 2, Iss 50 (2021)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN PL RU UK
topic	compliance international trade protectionism neo-protectionism international relations discrimination Economics as a science HB71-74
spellingShingle	compliance international trade protectionism neo-protectionism international relations discrimination Economics as a science HB71-74 Malte Pehl LL.M. Zwetelina Gankova-Ivanova Franz Peter Lang THE RETURN OF NEO-PROTECTIONISM?
description	As a moral corrective, compliance rules may be particularly important for the internal relationships of employees in a company and for the relationships between different companies. There original purpose was to ensure correctness and fairness in day-to-day business. This article analyzes the role of compliance rules as a non-tariff trade barrier and thus as an instrument of neo-protectionism. The analysis combines economic and legal aspects in the sense of the "institutional economics". The authors deliver a critical examination of the effects of compliance rules in the prevailing world trading system with many empirical examples. They come to the conclusion that with new, extended “Compliance Rules”, governments have an new instrument for protecting their economies by blaming foreign companies (exporters an investors) being not complying with this rules. They can use the argument of a violation of the existing rules, threaten legal sanctions or even intervene by law massively. The essay makes it clear that with a steady increase in such national regulations of entrepreneurial activity via moral aspects, a protectionist effect is achieved. This can also have a stronger impact on the own domestic economy than on the foreign trade and can be directed against its operators
format	article
author	Malte Pehl LL.M. Zwetelina Gankova-Ivanova Franz Peter Lang
author_facet	Malte Pehl LL.M. Zwetelina Gankova-Ivanova Franz Peter Lang
author_sort	Malte Pehl LL.M.
title	THE RETURN OF NEO-PROTECTIONISM?
title_short	THE RETURN OF NEO-PROTECTIONISM?
title_full	THE RETURN OF NEO-PROTECTIONISM?
title_fullStr	THE RETURN OF NEO-PROTECTIONISM?
title_full_unstemmed	THE RETURN OF NEO-PROTECTIONISM?
title_sort	return of neo-protectionism?
publisher	Consilium LLC
publishDate	2021
url	https://doaj.org/article/fe9e29af08c94c939d7df8ed36bf4019
work_keys_str_mv	AT maltepehlllm thereturnofneoprotectionism AT zwetelinagankovaivanova thereturnofneoprotectionism AT franzpeterlang thereturnofneoprotectionism AT maltepehlllm returnofneoprotectionism AT zwetelinagankovaivanova returnofneoprotectionism AT franzpeterlang returnofneoprotectionism
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THE RETURN OF NEO-PROTECTIONISM?

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