Auditor Tenure and Earnings Management

This paper examines the relationship between the length of auditor tenure and the extent of corporate earnings management. In particular, we test the relationship between the length of auditor tenure and the magnitude of absolute discretionary accruals, using a sample of 133 firms over the period 13...

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Autores principales: Gholamreza Karami, Ameneh Bazrafshan, Amir Mohammadi
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Lenguaje:FA
Publicado: Shahid Bahonar University of Kerman 2011
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Acceso en línea:https://doaj.org/article/ff53e4f2c6204741b4433b8b50dbda97
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spelling oai:doaj.org-article:ff53e4f2c6204741b4433b8b50dbda972021-11-04T19:40:24ZAuditor Tenure and Earnings Management2008-89142476-292X10.22103/jak.2011.34https://doaj.org/article/ff53e4f2c6204741b4433b8b50dbda972011-03-01T00:00:00Zhttps://jak.uk.ac.ir/article_34_d6c399e6aa4ccb30b3ed27e855176e99.pdfhttps://doaj.org/toc/2008-8914https://doaj.org/toc/2476-292XThis paper examines the relationship between the length of auditor tenure and the extent of corporate earnings management. In particular, we test the relationship between the length of auditor tenure and the magnitude of absolute discretionary accruals, using a sample of 133 firms over the period 1379 to 1385. We find a positive relationship between the tenure and absolute discretionary accruals. These findings show that as auditor tenure increases, the reporting flexibility in management using discretionary accruals rises. We also examine the relationship between auditor tenure and signed discretionary accruals. We find a significant negative relationship that is consistent with the view that management uses reporting flexibility to reduce reported earnings.Gholamreza KaramiAmeneh BazrafshanAmir MohammadiShahid Bahonar University of Kermanarticleauditor tenureauditor rotationearnings managementconservatismAccounting. BookkeepingHF5601-5689FAمجله دانش حسابداری, Vol 2, Iss 4, Pp 65-82 (2011)
institution DOAJ
collection DOAJ
language FA
topic auditor tenure
auditor rotation
earnings management
conservatism
Accounting. Bookkeeping
HF5601-5689
spellingShingle auditor tenure
auditor rotation
earnings management
conservatism
Accounting. Bookkeeping
HF5601-5689
Gholamreza Karami
Ameneh Bazrafshan
Amir Mohammadi
Auditor Tenure and Earnings Management
description This paper examines the relationship between the length of auditor tenure and the extent of corporate earnings management. In particular, we test the relationship between the length of auditor tenure and the magnitude of absolute discretionary accruals, using a sample of 133 firms over the period 1379 to 1385. We find a positive relationship between the tenure and absolute discretionary accruals. These findings show that as auditor tenure increases, the reporting flexibility in management using discretionary accruals rises. We also examine the relationship between auditor tenure and signed discretionary accruals. We find a significant negative relationship that is consistent with the view that management uses reporting flexibility to reduce reported earnings.
format article
author Gholamreza Karami
Ameneh Bazrafshan
Amir Mohammadi
author_facet Gholamreza Karami
Ameneh Bazrafshan
Amir Mohammadi
author_sort Gholamreza Karami
title Auditor Tenure and Earnings Management
title_short Auditor Tenure and Earnings Management
title_full Auditor Tenure and Earnings Management
title_fullStr Auditor Tenure and Earnings Management
title_full_unstemmed Auditor Tenure and Earnings Management
title_sort auditor tenure and earnings management
publisher Shahid Bahonar University of Kerman
publishDate 2011
url https://doaj.org/article/ff53e4f2c6204741b4433b8b50dbda97
work_keys_str_mv AT gholamrezakarami auditortenureandearningsmanagement
AT amenehbazrafshan auditortenureandearningsmanagement
AT amirmohammadi auditortenureandearningsmanagement
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