THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE CHILEAN TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY

Chile's economic performance since the mid 1990s has been outstanding. Several reasons account for this success. The strong initial position of the economy was a crucial asset. Broad consensus on economic matters helped a lot. This paper argues that the institutional setup was key to this succe...

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Autor principal:	SAPELLI,CLAUDIO
Lenguaje:	English
Publicado:	Instituto de Economía, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile 2000
Materias:	Political economics credibility time inconsistency institutions
Acceso en línea:	http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0717-68212000011200005
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spelling	oai:scielo:S0717-682120000112000052002-04-30THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE CHILEAN TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACYSAPELLI,CLAUDIO Political economics credibility time inconsistency institutions Chile's economic performance since the mid 1990s has been outstanding. Several reasons account for this success. The strong initial position of the economy was a crucial asset. Broad consensus on economic matters helped a lot. This paper argues that the institutional setup was key to this success. Of course, there are many reasons why events unfolded as they did (the people, the ideas at the time, the external conditions, the internal economic situation, the institutional setup, etc.). We study in the paper how changes in the institutional setup may have constrained behavior during the transition, and also discuss how it may help (or hinder) the preservation of such economic performance in the future. For this we use the models from political economics and analyze how the institutional constraint contributed to the transition. The paper concludes that the institutional setup was important. Policy making involves the interplay of what might be termed big and small institutions. Running through much of the literature on economic reform is the recognition that it is not enough to get certain policies right; it is also important to get institutions right. The technocratic approach to this problem is the creation of independent agencies: independent central banks, autonomous regulatory agencies, independent judiciaries, and so forth. The Chilean process is remarkable in its concern to appropriately design both big and small institutions so to provide an adequate framework for decision making by the private sectorinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessInstituto de Economía, Pontificia Universidad Católica de ChileCuadernos de economía v.37 n.112 20002000-12-01text/htmlhttp://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0717-68212000011200005en10.4067/S0717-68212000011200005
institution	Scielo Chile
collection	Scielo Chile
language	English
topic	Political economics credibility time inconsistency institutions
spellingShingle	Political economics credibility time inconsistency institutions SAPELLI,CLAUDIO THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE CHILEAN TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY
description	Chile's economic performance since the mid 1990s has been outstanding. Several reasons account for this success. The strong initial position of the economy was a crucial asset. Broad consensus on economic matters helped a lot. This paper argues that the institutional setup was key to this success. Of course, there are many reasons why events unfolded as they did (the people, the ideas at the time, the external conditions, the internal economic situation, the institutional setup, etc.). We study in the paper how changes in the institutional setup may have constrained behavior during the transition, and also discuss how it may help (or hinder) the preservation of such economic performance in the future. For this we use the models from political economics and analyze how the institutional constraint contributed to the transition. The paper concludes that the institutional setup was important. Policy making involves the interplay of what might be termed big and small institutions. Running through much of the literature on economic reform is the recognition that it is not enough to get certain policies right; it is also important to get institutions right. The technocratic approach to this problem is the creation of independent agencies: independent central banks, autonomous regulatory agencies, independent judiciaries, and so forth. The Chilean process is remarkable in its concern to appropriately design both big and small institutions so to provide an adequate framework for decision making by the private sector
author	SAPELLI,CLAUDIO
author_facet	SAPELLI,CLAUDIO
author_sort	SAPELLI,CLAUDIO
title	THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE CHILEAN TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY
title_short	THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE CHILEAN TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY
title_full	THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE CHILEAN TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY
title_fullStr	THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE CHILEAN TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY
title_full_unstemmed	THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE CHILEAN TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY
title_sort	political economy of the chilean transition to democracy
publisher	Instituto de Economía, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile
publishDate	2000
url	http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0717-68212000011200005
work_keys_str_mv	AT sapelliclaudio thepoliticaleconomyofthechileantransitiontodemocracy AT sapelliclaudio politicaleconomyofthechileantransitiontodemocracy
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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE CHILEAN TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY

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