Invited Paper: Learning and Belief Based Trade

Invited Paper: Learning and Belief Based Trade

We use the theory of learning in games to show that no-trade results do not require that gains from trade are common knowledge nor that play is a Nash equilibrium

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: FUDENBERG,DREW, LEVINE,DAVID K
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Instituto de Economía, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile 2005
Materias:
No-Trade Theorem
Common Knowledge
Learning
Self-Confirming Equilibria
Marginal Best Response Distribution
Acceso en línea:http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0717-68212005012600001
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