An Auction Mechanism for the Commons: Some Extensions

An Auction Mechanism for the Commons: Some Extensions

Efficient regulation of the commons requires information about the regulated firms that is rarely available to regulators (e.g., cost of pollution abatement). Montero (2008) proposes a simple mechanism for inducing firms to truthfully reveal their private information: a uniform price sealed-bid auct...

Descripción completa

Guardado en:
Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: MONTERO,JUAN-PABLO
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Instituto de Economía, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile 2007
Materias:
Externalities
Asymmetric Information
Uniform-Price Auction
Acceso en línea:http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0717-68212007000200001
Etiquetas: Agregar Etiqueta
Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!
id oai:scielo:S0717-68212007000200001
record_format dspace
spelling oai:scielo:S0717-682120070002000012007-12-27An Auction Mechanism for the Commons: Some ExtensionsMONTERO,JUAN-PABLO Externalities Asymmetric Information Uniform-Price Auction Efficient regulation of the commons requires information about the regulated firms that is rarely available to regulators (e.g., cost of pollution abatement). Montero (2008) proposes a simple mechanism for inducing firms to truthfully reveal their private information: a uniform price sealed-bid auction of an endogenous number of (transferable) licenses with a fraction of the auction revenues given back to firms. This paper discuses further properties of the mechanism including its extension to the possibility of private externalities and non-transferability of licencesinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessInstituto de Economía, Pontificia Universidad Católica de ChileCuadernos de economía v.44 n.130 20072007-11-01text/htmlhttp://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0717-68212007000200001en10.4067/S0717-68212007000200001
institution Scielo Chile
collection Scielo Chile
language English
topic Externalities
Asymmetric Information
Uniform-Price Auction
spellingShingle Externalities
Asymmetric Information
Uniform-Price Auction
MONTERO,JUAN-PABLO
An Auction Mechanism for the Commons: Some Extensions
description Efficient regulation of the commons requires information about the regulated firms that is rarely available to regulators (e.g., cost of pollution abatement). Montero (2008) proposes a simple mechanism for inducing firms to truthfully reveal their private information: a uniform price sealed-bid auction of an endogenous number of (transferable) licenses with a fraction of the auction revenues given back to firms. This paper discuses further properties of the mechanism including its extension to the possibility of private externalities and non-transferability of licences
author MONTERO,JUAN-PABLO
author_facet MONTERO,JUAN-PABLO
author_sort MONTERO,JUAN-PABLO
title An Auction Mechanism for the Commons: Some Extensions
title_short An Auction Mechanism for the Commons: Some Extensions
title_full An Auction Mechanism for the Commons: Some Extensions
title_fullStr An Auction Mechanism for the Commons: Some Extensions
title_full_unstemmed An Auction Mechanism for the Commons: Some Extensions
title_sort auction mechanism for the commons: some extensions
publisher Instituto de Economía, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile
publishDate 2007
url http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0717-68212007000200001
work_keys_str_mv AT monterojuanpablo anauctionmechanismforthecommonssomeextensions
AT monterojuanpablo auctionmechanismforthecommonssomeextensions
_version_ 1718442406391578624

Ejemplares similares