An Auction Mechanism for the Commons: Some Extensions
Efficient regulation of the commons requires information about the regulated firms that is rarely available to regulators (e.g., cost of pollution abatement). Montero (2008) proposes a simple mechanism for inducing firms to truthfully reveal their private information: a uniform price sealed-bid auct...
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Autor principal: | MONTERO,JUAN-PABLO |
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Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Instituto de Economía, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile
2007
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0717-68212007000200001 |
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