Veto players in presidential regimes: institutional variables and policy change
This paper develops a computational model to explore the effect of veto players in presidential regimes. We discuss the relationship between the legislative powers of the president and the configuration of veto players, and analyze how the number of legislative parties and their cohesion affect poli...
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| Autores principales: | , |
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| Lenguaje: | English |
| Publicado: |
Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. Instituto de Ciencia Política
2009
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0718-090X2009000300002 |
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| Sumario: | This paper develops a computational model to explore the effect of veto players in presidential regimes. We discuss the relationship between the legislative powers of the president and the configuration of veto players, and analyze how the number of legislative parties and their cohesion affect policy stability we develop a computational model to estimate the simultaneous impact of these factors in a conventional two-dimensional policy space. The results suggest that party fragmentation has mixed implications while decree authority is a key factor explaining policy stability. The impact of most institutional variables is conditional on the position of the players. |
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