Veto players in presidential regimes: institutional variables and policy change

This paper develops a computational model to explore the effect of veto players in presidential regimes. We discuss the relationship between the legislative powers of the president and the configuration of veto players, and analyze how the number of legislative parties and their cohesion affect poli...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales:	PÉREZ-LIÑÁN,ANÍBAL, RODRÍGUEZ-RAGA,JUAN CARLOS
Lenguaje:	English
Publicado:	Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. Instituto de Ciencia Política 2009
Materias:	Veto Players Presidential Regimes Legislative Parties Party Fragmentation Legislative Power
Acceso en línea:	http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0718-090X2009000300002
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spelling	oai:scielo:S0718-090X20090003000022010-03-09Veto players in presidential regimes: institutional variables and policy changePÉREZ-LIÑÁN,ANÍBALRODRÍGUEZ-RAGA,JUAN CARLOS Veto Players Presidential Regimes Legislative Parties Party Fragmentation Legislative Power This paper develops a computational model to explore the effect of veto players in presidential regimes. We discuss the relationship between the legislative powers of the president and the configuration of veto players, and analyze how the number of legislative parties and their cohesion affect policy stability we develop a computational model to estimate the simultaneous impact of these factors in a conventional two-dimensional policy space. The results suggest that party fragmentation has mixed implications while decree authority is a key factor explaining policy stability. The impact of most institutional variables is conditional on the position of the players.info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessPontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. Instituto de Ciencia PolíticaRevista de ciencia política (Santiago) v.29 n.3 20092009-01-01text/htmlhttp://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0718-090X2009000300002en10.4067/S0718-090X2009000300002
institution	Scielo Chile
collection	Scielo Chile
language	English
topic	Veto Players Presidential Regimes Legislative Parties Party Fragmentation Legislative Power
spellingShingle	Veto Players Presidential Regimes Legislative Parties Party Fragmentation Legislative Power PÉREZ-LIÑÁN,ANÍBAL RODRÍGUEZ-RAGA,JUAN CARLOS Veto players in presidential regimes: institutional variables and policy change
description	This paper develops a computational model to explore the effect of veto players in presidential regimes. We discuss the relationship between the legislative powers of the president and the configuration of veto players, and analyze how the number of legislative parties and their cohesion affect policy stability we develop a computational model to estimate the simultaneous impact of these factors in a conventional two-dimensional policy space. The results suggest that party fragmentation has mixed implications while decree authority is a key factor explaining policy stability. The impact of most institutional variables is conditional on the position of the players.
author	PÉREZ-LIÑÁN,ANÍBAL RODRÍGUEZ-RAGA,JUAN CARLOS
author_facet	PÉREZ-LIÑÁN,ANÍBAL RODRÍGUEZ-RAGA,JUAN CARLOS
author_sort	PÉREZ-LIÑÁN,ANÍBAL
title	Veto players in presidential regimes: institutional variables and policy change
title_short	Veto players in presidential regimes: institutional variables and policy change
title_full	Veto players in presidential regimes: institutional variables and policy change
title_fullStr	Veto players in presidential regimes: institutional variables and policy change
title_full_unstemmed	Veto players in presidential regimes: institutional variables and policy change
title_sort	veto players in presidential regimes: institutional variables and policy change
publisher	Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. Instituto de Ciencia Política
publishDate	2009
url	http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0718-090X2009000300002
work_keys_str_mv	AT perezlinananibal vetoplayersinpresidentialregimesinstitutionalvariablesandpolicychange AT rodriguezragajuancarlos vetoplayersinpresidentialregimesinstitutionalvariablesandpolicychange
_version_	1714201714079301632

Veto players in presidential regimes: institutional variables and policy change

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