Veto players in presidential regimes: institutional variables and policy change
This paper develops a computational model to explore the effect of veto players in presidential regimes. We discuss the relationship between the legislative powers of the president and the configuration of veto players, and analyze how the number of legislative parties and their cohesion affect poli...
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Auteurs principaux: | PÉREZ-LIÑÁN,ANÍBAL, RODRÍGUEZ-RAGA,JUAN CARLOS |
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Langue: | English |
Publié: |
Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. Instituto de Ciencia Política
2009
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Sujets: | |
Accès en ligne: | http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0718-090X2009000300002 |
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