Trusting the Dependent Judiciary: Evidence From Ecuador
ABSTRACT The literature on judicial politics has assumed that judicial independence and trust in the judiciary go hand in hand. Based on evidence from Ecuador, I show that citizens’ trust and support for the judiciary can increase despite decreasing levels of judicial independence, which I...
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| Lenguaje: | English |
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Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. Instituto de Ciencia Política
2020
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| Acceso en línea: | http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0718-090X2020000300643 |
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| Sumario: | ABSTRACT The literature on judicial politics has assumed that judicial independence and trust in the judiciary go hand in hand. Based on evidence from Ecuador, I show that citizens’ trust and support for the judiciary can increase despite decreasing levels of judicial independence, which I argue is largely driven by citizens’ approval of executive performance in office. Popular presidents send cues to their constituents regarding how and why the judiciary should be trusted, despite its institutional flaws. These results open the possibility to question whether public trust in the judiciary necessarily stems from the presence of independent judicial institutions. |
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