A Multi-Attribute Auction Mechanism based on Conditional Constraints and Conditional Qualitative Preferences
Auctioning multi-dimensional items is a key challenge, which requires rigorous tools. This study proposes a multi-round, first-score, semi-sealed multi-attribute reverse auction system. A fundamental concern in multiattribute auctions is acquiring a useful description of the buyers’ indivi...
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Universidad de Talca
2016
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oai:scielo:S0718-187620160001000022018-10-12A Multi-Attribute Auction Mechanism based on Conditional Constraints and Conditional Qualitative PreferencesSadaoui,SamiraKumar Shil,Shubhashis Constraint specification Qualitative preference specification Winner determination Multi-attribute and reverse auctions Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT Mechanism design Multicriteria decision making (MCDM Auctioning multi-dimensional items is a key challenge, which requires rigorous tools. This study proposes a multi-round, first-score, semi-sealed multi-attribute reverse auction system. A fundamental concern in multiattribute auctions is acquiring a useful description of the buyers’ individuated requirements: hard constraints and qualitative preferences. To consider real requirements, we express dependencies among attributes. Indeed, our system enables buyers eliciting conditional constraints as well as conditional preferences. However, determining the winner with diverse criteria may be very time consuming. Therefore, it is more useful for our auction to process quantitative data. A challenge here is to satisfy buyers with more facilities, and at the same time keep the auctions efficient. To meet this challenge, our system maps the qualitative preferences into a multi-criteria decision rule. It also completely automates the winner determination since it is a very difficult task for buyers to estimate quantitatively the attribute weights and define attributes value functions. Our procurement auction looks for the outcome that satisfies all the constraints and best matches the preferences. We demonstrate the feasibility and measure the time performance of the proposed system through a 10-attribute auction. Finally, we assess the user acceptance of our requirements specification and winner selection tool.info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessUniversidad de TalcaJournal of theoretical and applied electronic commerce research v.11 n.1 20162016-01-01text/htmlhttp://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0718-18762016000100002en10.4067/S0718-18762016000100002 |
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Scielo Chile |
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Scielo Chile |
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English |
topic |
Constraint specification Qualitative preference specification Winner determination Multi-attribute and reverse auctions Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT Mechanism design Multicriteria decision making (MCDM |
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Constraint specification Qualitative preference specification Winner determination Multi-attribute and reverse auctions Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT Mechanism design Multicriteria decision making (MCDM Sadaoui,Samira Kumar Shil,Shubhashis A Multi-Attribute Auction Mechanism based on Conditional Constraints and Conditional Qualitative Preferences |
description |
Auctioning multi-dimensional items is a key challenge, which requires rigorous tools. This study proposes a multi-round, first-score, semi-sealed multi-attribute reverse auction system. A fundamental concern in multiattribute auctions is acquiring a useful description of the buyers’ individuated requirements: hard constraints and qualitative preferences. To consider real requirements, we express dependencies among attributes. Indeed, our system enables buyers eliciting conditional constraints as well as conditional preferences. However, determining the winner with diverse criteria may be very time consuming. Therefore, it is more useful for our auction to process quantitative data. A challenge here is to satisfy buyers with more facilities, and at the same time keep the auctions efficient. To meet this challenge, our system maps the qualitative preferences into a multi-criteria decision rule. It also completely automates the winner determination since it is a very difficult task for buyers to estimate quantitatively the attribute weights and define attributes value functions. Our procurement auction looks for the outcome that satisfies all the constraints and best matches the preferences. We demonstrate the feasibility and measure the time performance of the proposed system through a 10-attribute auction. Finally, we assess the user acceptance of our requirements specification and winner selection tool. |
author |
Sadaoui,Samira Kumar Shil,Shubhashis |
author_facet |
Sadaoui,Samira Kumar Shil,Shubhashis |
author_sort |
Sadaoui,Samira |
title |
A Multi-Attribute Auction Mechanism based on Conditional Constraints and Conditional Qualitative Preferences |
title_short |
A Multi-Attribute Auction Mechanism based on Conditional Constraints and Conditional Qualitative Preferences |
title_full |
A Multi-Attribute Auction Mechanism based on Conditional Constraints and Conditional Qualitative Preferences |
title_fullStr |
A Multi-Attribute Auction Mechanism based on Conditional Constraints and Conditional Qualitative Preferences |
title_full_unstemmed |
A Multi-Attribute Auction Mechanism based on Conditional Constraints and Conditional Qualitative Preferences |
title_sort |
multi-attribute auction mechanism based on conditional constraints and conditional qualitative preferences |
publisher |
Universidad de Talca |
publishDate |
2016 |
url |
http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0718-18762016000100002 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT sadaouisamira amultiattributeauctionmechanismbasedonconditionalconstraintsandconditionalqualitativepreferences AT kumarshilshubhashis amultiattributeauctionmechanismbasedonconditionalconstraintsandconditionalqualitativepreferences AT sadaouisamira multiattributeauctionmechanismbasedonconditionalconstraintsandconditionalqualitativepreferences AT kumarshilshubhashis multiattributeauctionmechanismbasedonconditionalconstraintsandconditionalqualitativepreferences |
_version_ |
1714202221583794176 |