CONDITIONALS AND DISJUNCTIONS IN MENTAL-LOGIC THEORY: A RESPONSE TO LIU AND CHOU (2012) AND TO LÓPEZ ASTORGA (2013)
Liu and Chou (2012) presented a two-step theory to describe reasoning both on the four traditional conditional syllogisms and on four parallel syllogisms that replace the conditional with a disjunction. This article proposes that although Liu and Chou show that the words if and or play an important...
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| Lenguaje: | English |
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Universidad de Talca. Instituto de Estudios Humanísticos
2014
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| Acceso en línea: | http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0718-23762014000200015 |
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| Sumario: | Liu and Chou (2012) presented a two-step theory to describe reasoning both on the four traditional conditional syllogisms and on four parallel syllogisms that replace the conditional with a disjunction. This article proposes that although Liu and Chou show that the words if and or play an important role in generating the data they report, their theory provides no explanation of how these words play any role. The article also corrects an assertion by López Astorga (2013) that mental-logic theory accounts for the findings of Liu and Chou by interpreting if as the material conditional. Instead I show why mental-logic theory rejects the material conditional and accounts for the data using a procedural-semantics approach to the meaning of logic particles. The article concludes that a theory like that of Liu and Chou requires something like mental-logic theory to account for their data. |
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