Collusion sustainability with optimal punishments and detection lags, with an application to a Cournot game

In this paper we characterize optimal punishments with detection lags when the market consists of n oligopolistic firms that compete à la Cournot. It is shown how in the presence of detection lags optimal punishments fail to restore cooperation as long as the number of lags increases. Moreover, coll...

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Autores principales:	Ciarreta,Aitor, Gutiérrez-Hita,Carlos
Lenguaje:	English
Publicado:	Universidad de Chile. Departamento de Economía 2013
Materias:	Optimal punishments detection lags collusion sustainability
Acceso en línea:	http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0718-52862013000200006
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spelling	oai:scielo:S0718-528620130002000062014-04-28Collusion sustainability with optimal punishments and detection lags, with an application to a Cournot gameCiarreta,AitorGutiérrez-Hita,Carlos Optimal punishments detection lags collusion sustainability In this paper we characterize optimal punishments with detection lags when the market consists of n oligopolistic firms that compete à la Cournot. It is shown how in the presence of detection lags optimal punishments fail to restore cooperation as long as the number of lags increases. Moreover, collusion sustainability is difficult to achieve also if the number of firms is low.info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessUniversidad de Chile. Departamento de EconomíaEstudios de economía v.40 n.2 20132013-12-01text/htmlhttp://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0718-52862013000200006en10.4067/S0718-52862013000200006
institution	Scielo Chile
collection	Scielo Chile
language	English
topic	Optimal punishments detection lags collusion sustainability
spellingShingle	Optimal punishments detection lags collusion sustainability Ciarreta,Aitor Gutiérrez-Hita,Carlos Collusion sustainability with optimal punishments and detection lags, with an application to a Cournot game
description	In this paper we characterize optimal punishments with detection lags when the market consists of n oligopolistic firms that compete à la Cournot. It is shown how in the presence of detection lags optimal punishments fail to restore cooperation as long as the number of lags increases. Moreover, collusion sustainability is difficult to achieve also if the number of firms is low.
author	Ciarreta,Aitor Gutiérrez-Hita,Carlos
author_facet	Ciarreta,Aitor Gutiérrez-Hita,Carlos
author_sort	Ciarreta,Aitor
title	Collusion sustainability with optimal punishments and detection lags, with an application to a Cournot game
title_short	Collusion sustainability with optimal punishments and detection lags, with an application to a Cournot game
title_full	Collusion sustainability with optimal punishments and detection lags, with an application to a Cournot game
title_fullStr	Collusion sustainability with optimal punishments and detection lags, with an application to a Cournot game
title_full_unstemmed	Collusion sustainability with optimal punishments and detection lags, with an application to a Cournot game
title_sort	collusion sustainability with optimal punishments and detection lags, with an application to a cournot game
publisher	Universidad de Chile. Departamento de Economía
publishDate	2013
url	http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0718-52862013000200006
work_keys_str_mv	AT ciarretaaitor collusionsustainabilitywithoptimalpunishmentsanddetectionlagswithanapplicationtoacournotgame AT gutierrezhitacarlos collusionsustainabilitywithoptimalpunishmentsanddetectionlagswithanapplicationtoacournotgame
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Collusion sustainability with optimal punishments and detection lags, with an application to a Cournot game

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