Optimal Zoning in Spatial Differentiation

Abstract: This study analyzes optimal zoning policy in a duopolistic spatial competition framework for both circular and linear spaces. A regulator is introduced in the third stage of the price-location game through a welfare function to model zoning preferences from firms and consumers. An equilibr...

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Autores principales: Hamoudi,Hamid, Rodríguez,Isabel, Martín-Bustamante,Marcos Sanz
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Universidad de Chile. Departamento de Economía 2017
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Acceso en línea:http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0718-52862017000100033
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spelling oai:scielo:S0718-528620170001000332017-07-21Optimal Zoning in Spatial DifferentiationHamoudi,HamidRodríguez,IsabelMartín-Bustamante,Marcos Sanz Zoning spatial competition welfare function equilibrium results industrial policy. Abstract: This study analyzes optimal zoning policy in a duopolistic spatial competition framework for both circular and linear spaces. A regulator is introduced in the third stage of the price-location game through a welfare function to model zoning preferences from firms and consumers. An equilibrium outcome is then found for both spatial configurations. When the regulator is inclined to favor consumers (consumer-oriented) both firms are restricted to locate at one point to serve the whole market. Nevertheless, when the preferences of the regulator are biased towards firms (firm-oriented) the zoning area is maximized, with both firms being located at the market boundaries. The equilibrium outcome confirms location patterns found in real life situations under a non-neutral regulator.info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessUniversidad de Chile. Departamento de EconomíaEstudios de economía v.44 n.1 20172017-06-01text/htmlhttp://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0718-52862017000100033en10.4067/S0718-52862017000100033
institution Scielo Chile
collection Scielo Chile
language English
topic Zoning
spatial competition
welfare function
equilibrium results
industrial policy.
spellingShingle Zoning
spatial competition
welfare function
equilibrium results
industrial policy.
Hamoudi,Hamid
Rodríguez,Isabel
Martín-Bustamante,Marcos Sanz
Optimal Zoning in Spatial Differentiation
description Abstract: This study analyzes optimal zoning policy in a duopolistic spatial competition framework for both circular and linear spaces. A regulator is introduced in the third stage of the price-location game through a welfare function to model zoning preferences from firms and consumers. An equilibrium outcome is then found for both spatial configurations. When the regulator is inclined to favor consumers (consumer-oriented) both firms are restricted to locate at one point to serve the whole market. Nevertheless, when the preferences of the regulator are biased towards firms (firm-oriented) the zoning area is maximized, with both firms being located at the market boundaries. The equilibrium outcome confirms location patterns found in real life situations under a non-neutral regulator.
author Hamoudi,Hamid
Rodríguez,Isabel
Martín-Bustamante,Marcos Sanz
author_facet Hamoudi,Hamid
Rodríguez,Isabel
Martín-Bustamante,Marcos Sanz
author_sort Hamoudi,Hamid
title Optimal Zoning in Spatial Differentiation
title_short Optimal Zoning in Spatial Differentiation
title_full Optimal Zoning in Spatial Differentiation
title_fullStr Optimal Zoning in Spatial Differentiation
title_full_unstemmed Optimal Zoning in Spatial Differentiation
title_sort optimal zoning in spatial differentiation
publisher Universidad de Chile. Departamento de Economía
publishDate 2017
url http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0718-52862017000100033
work_keys_str_mv AT hamoudihamid optimalzoninginspatialdifferentiation
AT rodriguezisabel optimalzoninginspatialdifferentiation
AT martinbustamantemarcossanz optimalzoninginspatialdifferentiation
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