Imperfect collusion in an asymmetric duopoly

Abstract: Using the coefficient of cooperation, we analyse the effect of cost asymmetries on collusive agreements when firms are able to coordinate on distinct output levels than the unrestricted joint profit maximization outcome. In this context, we first investigate the extent to which collusive a...

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Autores principales:	Escrihuela-Villar,Marc, Gutiérrez-Hita,Carlos
Lenguaje:	English
Publicado:	Universidad de Chile. Departamento de Economía 2018
Materias:	Imperfect collusion cost asymmetries sustainability
Acceso en línea:	http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0718-52862018000100029
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spelling	oai:scielo:S0718-528620180001000292018-07-12Imperfect collusion in an asymmetric duopolyEscrihuela-Villar,MarcGutiérrez-Hita,Carlos Imperfect collusion cost asymmetries sustainability Abstract: Using the coefficient of cooperation, we analyse the effect of cost asymmetries on collusive agreements when firms are able to coordinate on distinct output levels than the unrestricted joint profit maximization outcome. In this context, we first investigate the extent to which collusive agreements are feasible. Secondly, we focus on collusion sustainability in an infinitely repeated game. We show that, regardless of the degree of cost asymmetry, at least some collusion is always sustainable. Finally, the degree of collusion is also endogeneised to show that cooperation has an upper bound determined by the most inefficient firm.info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessUniversidad de Chile. Departamento de EconomíaEstudios de economía v.45 n.1 20182018-06-01text/htmlhttp://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0718-52862018000100029en10.4067/S0718-52862018000100029
institution	Scielo Chile
collection	Scielo Chile
language	English
topic	Imperfect collusion cost asymmetries sustainability
spellingShingle	Imperfect collusion cost asymmetries sustainability Escrihuela-Villar,Marc Gutiérrez-Hita,Carlos Imperfect collusion in an asymmetric duopoly
description	Abstract: Using the coefficient of cooperation, we analyse the effect of cost asymmetries on collusive agreements when firms are able to coordinate on distinct output levels than the unrestricted joint profit maximization outcome. In this context, we first investigate the extent to which collusive agreements are feasible. Secondly, we focus on collusion sustainability in an infinitely repeated game. We show that, regardless of the degree of cost asymmetry, at least some collusion is always sustainable. Finally, the degree of collusion is also endogeneised to show that cooperation has an upper bound determined by the most inefficient firm.
author	Escrihuela-Villar,Marc Gutiérrez-Hita,Carlos
author_facet	Escrihuela-Villar,Marc Gutiérrez-Hita,Carlos
author_sort	Escrihuela-Villar,Marc
title	Imperfect collusion in an asymmetric duopoly
title_short	Imperfect collusion in an asymmetric duopoly
title_full	Imperfect collusion in an asymmetric duopoly
title_fullStr	Imperfect collusion in an asymmetric duopoly
title_full_unstemmed	Imperfect collusion in an asymmetric duopoly
title_sort	imperfect collusion in an asymmetric duopoly
publisher	Universidad de Chile. Departamento de Economía
publishDate	2018
url	http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0718-52862018000100029
work_keys_str_mv	AT escrihuelavillarmarc imperfectcollusioninanasymmetricduopoly AT gutierrezhitacarlos imperfectcollusioninanasymmetricduopoly
_version_	1714205051066515456

Imperfect collusion in an asymmetric duopoly

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