Imperfect collusion in an asymmetric duopoly
Abstract: Using the coefficient of cooperation, we analyse the effect of cost asymmetries on collusive agreements when firms are able to coordinate on distinct output levels than the unrestricted joint profit maximization outcome. In this context, we first investigate the extent to which collusive a...
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| Autores principales: | , |
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| Lenguaje: | English |
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Universidad de Chile. Departamento de Economía
2018
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0718-52862018000100029 |
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