Tolerance of noncompliance: Discretion rather than simple rules?
Abstract: We argue that societies sometimes choose not to enforce the law to gain “flexibility”. Especially developing countries face a dilemma between discretion and commitment to only partially-contingent rules. Rules are good for incentives, but discretion may be more R...
Guardado en:
| Autores principales: | , |
|---|---|
| Lenguaje: | English |
| Publicado: |
Universidad de Chile. Departamento de Economía
2019
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0718-52862019000100031 |
| Etiquetas: |
Agregar Etiqueta
Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!
|
| Sumario: | Abstract: We argue that societies sometimes choose not to enforce the law to gain “flexibility”. Especially developing countries face a dilemma between discretion and commitment to only partially-contingent rules. Rules are good for incentives, but discretion may be more “flexible”. We embed this dilemma in a political model and show that citizens will not support strong enforcement institutions unless the state is able to commit to sufficiently sophisticated redistributive policies. |
|---|