Tolerance of noncompliance: Discretion rather than simple rules?

Abstract: We argue that societies sometimes choose not to enforce the law to gain “flexibility”. Especially developing countries face a dilemma between discretion and commitment to only partially-contingent rules. Rules are good for incentives, but discretion may be more &#82...

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Autores principales:	Forteza,Álvaro, Noboa,Cecilia
Lenguaje:	English
Publicado:	Universidad de Chile. Departamento de Economía 2019
Materias:	Discretion commitment simple rules informality enforcement JEL Classification: D71, D81, E26, O17
Acceso en línea:	http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0718-52862019000100031
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spelling	oai:scielo:S0718-528620190001000312019-07-31Tolerance of noncompliance: Discretion rather than simple rules?Forteza,ÁlvaroNoboa,Cecilia Discretion commitment simple rules informality enforcement JEL Classification: D71, D81, E26, O17 Abstract: We argue that societies sometimes choose not to enforce the law to gain “flexibility”. Especially developing countries face a dilemma between discretion and commitment to only partially-contingent rules. Rules are good for incentives, but discretion may be more “flexible”. We embed this dilemma in a political model and show that citizens will not support strong enforcement institutions unless the state is able to commit to sufficiently sophisticated redistributive policies.info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessUniversidad de Chile. Departamento de EconomíaEstudios de economía v.46 n.1 20192019-06-01text/htmlhttp://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0718-52862019000100031en10.4067/S0718-52862019000100031
institution	Scielo Chile
collection	Scielo Chile
language	English
topic	Discretion commitment simple rules informality enforcement JEL Classification: D71, D81, E26, O17
spellingShingle	Discretion commitment simple rules informality enforcement JEL Classification: D71, D81, E26, O17 Forteza,Álvaro Noboa,Cecilia Tolerance of noncompliance: Discretion rather than simple rules?
description	Abstract: We argue that societies sometimes choose not to enforce the law to gain “flexibility”. Especially developing countries face a dilemma between discretion and commitment to only partially-contingent rules. Rules are good for incentives, but discretion may be more “flexible”. We embed this dilemma in a political model and show that citizens will not support strong enforcement institutions unless the state is able to commit to sufficiently sophisticated redistributive policies.
author	Forteza,Álvaro Noboa,Cecilia
author_facet	Forteza,Álvaro Noboa,Cecilia
author_sort	Forteza,Álvaro
title	Tolerance of noncompliance: Discretion rather than simple rules?
title_short	Tolerance of noncompliance: Discretion rather than simple rules?
title_full	Tolerance of noncompliance: Discretion rather than simple rules?
title_fullStr	Tolerance of noncompliance: Discretion rather than simple rules?
title_full_unstemmed	Tolerance of noncompliance: Discretion rather than simple rules?
title_sort	tolerance of noncompliance: discretion rather than simple rules?
publisher	Universidad de Chile. Departamento de Economía
publishDate	2019
url	http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0718-52862019000100031
work_keys_str_mv	AT fortezaalvaro toleranceofnoncompliancediscretionratherthansimplerules AT noboacecilia toleranceofnoncompliancediscretionratherthansimplerules
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Tolerance of noncompliance: Discretion rather than simple rules?

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