Privatization and environmental policy in a mixed oligopoly

Abstract: This paper analyzes the interaction between two political economy decisions by a government: whether to privatize a public firm and what environmental policy to choose (an environmental tax or an emission standard). We find that when market competition is weak the government does not priva...

Descripción completa

Guardado en:

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales:	Bárcena-Ruiz,Juan Carlos, Dong,Quan, Garzón,María Bergoña
Lenguaje:	English
Publicado:	Universidad de Chile. Departamento de Economía 2019
Materias:	Environmental tax emission standard mixed oligopoly privatization
Acceso en línea:	http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0718-52862019000200173
Etiquetas:	Agregar Etiqueta Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

id	oai:scielo:S0718-52862019000200173
record_format	dspace
spelling	oai:scielo:S0718-528620190002001732020-01-07Privatization and environmental policy in a mixed oligopolyBárcena-Ruiz,Juan CarlosDong,QuanGarzón,María Bergoña Environmental tax emission standard mixed oligopoly privatization Abstract: This paper analyzes the interaction between two political economy decisions by a government: whether to privatize a public firm and what environmental policy to choose (an environmental tax or an emission standard). We find that when market competition is weak the government does not privatize the public firm and sets an environmental tax. When it is intermediate the public firm is not privatized and the government sets an environmental standard. Finally, when market competition is strong the government privatizes the public firm and is indifferent between a tax and a standard.info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessUniversidad de Chile. Departamento de EconomíaEstudios de economía v.46 n.2 20192019-12-01text/htmlhttp://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0718-52862019000200173en10.4067/S0718-52862019000200173
institution	Scielo Chile
collection	Scielo Chile
language	English
topic	Environmental tax emission standard mixed oligopoly privatization
spellingShingle	Environmental tax emission standard mixed oligopoly privatization Bárcena-Ruiz,Juan Carlos Dong,Quan Garzón,María Bergoña Privatization and environmental policy in a mixed oligopoly
description	Abstract: This paper analyzes the interaction between two political economy decisions by a government: whether to privatize a public firm and what environmental policy to choose (an environmental tax or an emission standard). We find that when market competition is weak the government does not privatize the public firm and sets an environmental tax. When it is intermediate the public firm is not privatized and the government sets an environmental standard. Finally, when market competition is strong the government privatizes the public firm and is indifferent between a tax and a standard.
author	Bárcena-Ruiz,Juan Carlos Dong,Quan Garzón,María Bergoña
author_facet	Bárcena-Ruiz,Juan Carlos Dong,Quan Garzón,María Bergoña
author_sort	Bárcena-Ruiz,Juan Carlos
title	Privatization and environmental policy in a mixed oligopoly
title_short	Privatization and environmental policy in a mixed oligopoly
title_full	Privatization and environmental policy in a mixed oligopoly
title_fullStr	Privatization and environmental policy in a mixed oligopoly
title_full_unstemmed	Privatization and environmental policy in a mixed oligopoly
title_sort	privatization and environmental policy in a mixed oligopoly
publisher	Universidad de Chile. Departamento de Economía
publishDate	2019
url	http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0718-52862019000200173
work_keys_str_mv	AT barcenaruizjuancarlos privatizationandenvironmentalpolicyinamixedoligopoly AT dongquan privatizationandenvironmentalpolicyinamixedoligopoly AT garzonmariabergona privatizationandenvironmentalpolicyinamixedoligopoly
_version_	1714205053895573504

Privatization and environmental policy in a mixed oligopoly

Ejemplares similares