Pollution, green union, and network industry

Abstract: In a network industry, this paper investigates the impact of network effects on total pollution under the presence of a union interested to “local” environmental damages (e.g., polluting production processes damaging workers’ health and the local environment w...

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Autores principales:	Fanti,Luciano, Buccella,Domenico
Lenguaje:	English
Publicado:	Universidad de Chile. Departamento de Economía 2021
Materias:	Network goods Cleaning technology Pollution production Green Unions Monopoly Cournot duopoly
Acceso en línea:	http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0718-52862021000200139
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spelling	oai:scielo:S0718-528620210002001392021-11-17Pollution, green union, and network industryFanti,LucianoBuccella,Domenico Network goods Cleaning technology Pollution production Green Unions Monopoly Cournot duopoly Abstract: In a network industry, this paper investigates the impact of network effects on total pollution under the presence of a union interested to “local” environmental damages (e.g., polluting production processes damaging workers’ health and the local environment where workers live). Under monopoly, it is shown that, on the one hand, network effects tend to increase the investments in the cleaning technology but, on the other hand, increase the polluting output; consequently, the effects on the total pollution are ambiguous. We also find that total pollution reduces (increases) with increasing network effects intensity if the market is sufficiently large (small). Moreover, the pollution-reducing result of increasing network effects appears when the existing network effects, the union’s environmental concerns and the technological efficiency are sufficiently large. These findings are qualitatively confirmed under Cournot duopoly, offering empirical, as well as policy, implication.info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessUniversidad de Chile. Departamento de EconomíaEstudios de economía v.48 n.2 20212021-07-01text/htmlhttp://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0718-52862021000200139en10.4067/S0718-52862021000200139
institution	Scielo Chile
collection	Scielo Chile
language	English
topic	Network goods Cleaning technology Pollution production Green Unions Monopoly Cournot duopoly
spellingShingle	Network goods Cleaning technology Pollution production Green Unions Monopoly Cournot duopoly Fanti,Luciano Buccella,Domenico Pollution, green union, and network industry
description	Abstract: In a network industry, this paper investigates the impact of network effects on total pollution under the presence of a union interested to “local” environmental damages (e.g., polluting production processes damaging workers’ health and the local environment where workers live). Under monopoly, it is shown that, on the one hand, network effects tend to increase the investments in the cleaning technology but, on the other hand, increase the polluting output; consequently, the effects on the total pollution are ambiguous. We also find that total pollution reduces (increases) with increasing network effects intensity if the market is sufficiently large (small). Moreover, the pollution-reducing result of increasing network effects appears when the existing network effects, the union’s environmental concerns and the technological efficiency are sufficiently large. These findings are qualitatively confirmed under Cournot duopoly, offering empirical, as well as policy, implication.
author	Fanti,Luciano Buccella,Domenico
author_facet	Fanti,Luciano Buccella,Domenico
author_sort	Fanti,Luciano
title	Pollution, green union, and network industry
title_short	Pollution, green union, and network industry
title_full	Pollution, green union, and network industry
title_fullStr	Pollution, green union, and network industry
title_full_unstemmed	Pollution, green union, and network industry
title_sort	pollution, green union, and network industry
publisher	Universidad de Chile. Departamento de Economía
publishDate	2021
url	http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0718-52862021000200139
work_keys_str_mv	AT fantiluciano pollutiongreenunionandnetworkindustry AT buccelladomenico pollutiongreenunionandnetworkindustry
_version_	1718324297778331648

Pollution, green union, and network industry

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