Analysis of the Optimal Sharing of Construction Risk in Public Procurement Contracts

Analysis of the Optimal Sharing of Construction Risk in Public Procurement Contracts

This paper discusses a model based on the agency theory to analyze the optimal transfer of construction risk in public works contracts. The base assumption is that of a contract between a principal (public authority) and an agent (firm), where the payment mechanism is linear and contains an incentiv...

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Autor principal: Sánchez Soliño,Antonio
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Escuela de Construcción Civil, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile 2014
Materias:
Incentives
Construction Risk
Public Procurement
Public Works
Risk Aversion
Acceso en línea:http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0718-915X2014000100009
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