VOTE BUYING, POLITICAL PATRONAGE AND SELECTIVE PLUNDER

This article introduces a political economy model for studying the relationship between the vote-buying strategy of a party that has won the mayoralty of a municipality in the last election and its preferences as the governing party on the municipal political space, given its desire to maintain its...

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Autor principal:	CENDALES,ANDRÉS
Lenguaje:	English
Publicado:	Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. Instituto de Economía. 2012
Materias:	Network games vote buying political patronage poverty political competition
Acceso en línea:	http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0719-04332012000200004
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spelling	oai:scielo:S0719-043320120002000042013-09-24VOTE BUYING, POLITICAL PATRONAGE AND SELECTIVE PLUNDERCENDALES,ANDRÉS Network games vote buying political patronage poverty political competition This article introduces a political economy model for studying the relationship between the vote-buying strategy of a party that has won the mayoralty of a municipality in the last election and its preferences as the governing party on the municipal political space, given its desire to maintain its position. The main result is that the governing party prefers to promote, given its clientelistic structure, the political agendas with which it selectively impoverishes worse-off (WO) individuals; this will allow that equilibrium prices in vote markets will be reduced in a next election, and therefore, it will help enable the governing party to achieve its objective of maintaining governmental power through its vote-buying strategy in the exchange network.info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessPontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. Instituto de Economía.Latin american journal of economics v.49 n.2 20122012-11-01text/htmlhttp://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0719-04332012000200004en10.7764/LAJE.49.2.237
institution	Scielo Chile
collection	Scielo Chile
language	English
topic	Network games vote buying political patronage poverty political competition
spellingShingle	Network games vote buying political patronage poverty political competition CENDALES,ANDRÉS VOTE BUYING, POLITICAL PATRONAGE AND SELECTIVE PLUNDER
description	This article introduces a political economy model for studying the relationship between the vote-buying strategy of a party that has won the mayoralty of a municipality in the last election and its preferences as the governing party on the municipal political space, given its desire to maintain its position. The main result is that the governing party prefers to promote, given its clientelistic structure, the political agendas with which it selectively impoverishes worse-off (WO) individuals; this will allow that equilibrium prices in vote markets will be reduced in a next election, and therefore, it will help enable the governing party to achieve its objective of maintaining governmental power through its vote-buying strategy in the exchange network.
author	CENDALES,ANDRÉS
author_facet	CENDALES,ANDRÉS
author_sort	CENDALES,ANDRÉS
title	VOTE BUYING, POLITICAL PATRONAGE AND SELECTIVE PLUNDER
title_short	VOTE BUYING, POLITICAL PATRONAGE AND SELECTIVE PLUNDER
title_full	VOTE BUYING, POLITICAL PATRONAGE AND SELECTIVE PLUNDER
title_fullStr	VOTE BUYING, POLITICAL PATRONAGE AND SELECTIVE PLUNDER
title_full_unstemmed	VOTE BUYING, POLITICAL PATRONAGE AND SELECTIVE PLUNDER
title_sort	vote buying, political patronage and selective plunder
publisher	Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. Instituto de Economía.
publishDate	2012
url	http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0719-04332012000200004
work_keys_str_mv	AT cendalesandres votebuyingpoliticalpatronageandselectiveplunder
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VOTE BUYING, POLITICAL PATRONAGE AND SELECTIVE PLUNDER

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