First Person and Body Ownership
Abstract: Bodily and mental self-ascriptions are forms of first-person thought where a subject attributes physical properties and psychological states to herself. The body-ownership view argues that a necessary and sufficient condition on such self-ascriptions is the existence of causal links betwee...
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| Autor principal: | |
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| Lenguaje: | English |
| Publicado: |
Universidad de La Serena/Facultad de Humanidades. Departamento de Artes y Letras.
2019
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0719-32622019000200230 |
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| Sumario: | Abstract: Bodily and mental self-ascriptions are forms of first-person thought where a subject attributes physical properties and psychological states to herself. The body-ownership view argues that a necessary and sufficient condition on such self-ascriptions is the existence of causal links between a spatio-temporal body and the self-ascribed properties or states. However, since P.F. Strawson’s influential attack, this view has been dismissed as a bad philosophical idea. The goal of this brief piece is to outline the body-ownership view and neutralise two classic lines of objection against it: on the one hand, that the stance is incoherent; and, on the other, that it has counterintuitive implications. |
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