First Person and Body Ownership

Abstract: Bodily and mental self-ascriptions are forms of first-person thought where a subject attributes physical properties and psychological states to herself. The body-ownership view argues that a necessary and sufficient condition on such self-ascriptions is the existence of causal links betwee...

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Autor principal: Sanhueza Rodríguez,Sebastián
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Universidad de La Serena/Facultad de Humanidades. Departamento de Artes y Letras. 2019
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Acceso en línea:http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0719-32622019000200230
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spelling oai:scielo:S0719-326220190002002302020-01-16First Person and Body OwnershipSanhueza Rodríguez,Sebastián first-person thought body-ownership causal links P.F. Strawson Animalism Abstract: Bodily and mental self-ascriptions are forms of first-person thought where a subject attributes physical properties and psychological states to herself. The body-ownership view argues that a necessary and sufficient condition on such self-ascriptions is the existence of causal links between a spatio-temporal body and the self-ascribed properties or states. However, since P.F. Strawson’s influential attack, this view has been dismissed as a bad philosophical idea. The goal of this brief piece is to outline the body-ownership view and neutralise two classic lines of objection against it: on the one hand, that the stance is incoherent; and, on the other, that it has counterintuitive implications.info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessUniversidad de La Serena/Facultad de Humanidades. Departamento de Artes y Letras. Logos (La Serena) v.29 n.2 20192019-12-01text/htmlhttp://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0719-32622019000200230en10.15443/rl2919
institution Scielo Chile
collection Scielo Chile
language English
topic first-person thought
body-ownership
causal links
P.F. Strawson
Animalism
spellingShingle first-person thought
body-ownership
causal links
P.F. Strawson
Animalism
Sanhueza Rodríguez,Sebastián
First Person and Body Ownership
description Abstract: Bodily and mental self-ascriptions are forms of first-person thought where a subject attributes physical properties and psychological states to herself. The body-ownership view argues that a necessary and sufficient condition on such self-ascriptions is the existence of causal links between a spatio-temporal body and the self-ascribed properties or states. However, since P.F. Strawson’s influential attack, this view has been dismissed as a bad philosophical idea. The goal of this brief piece is to outline the body-ownership view and neutralise two classic lines of objection against it: on the one hand, that the stance is incoherent; and, on the other, that it has counterintuitive implications.
author Sanhueza Rodríguez,Sebastián
author_facet Sanhueza Rodríguez,Sebastián
author_sort Sanhueza Rodríguez,Sebastián
title First Person and Body Ownership
title_short First Person and Body Ownership
title_full First Person and Body Ownership
title_fullStr First Person and Body Ownership
title_full_unstemmed First Person and Body Ownership
title_sort first person and body ownership
publisher Universidad de La Serena/Facultad de Humanidades. Departamento de Artes y Letras.
publishDate 2019
url http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0719-32622019000200230
work_keys_str_mv AT sanhuezarodriguezsebastian firstpersonandbodyownership
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