First Person and Body Ownership
Abstract: Bodily and mental self-ascriptions are forms of first-person thought where a subject attributes physical properties and psychological states to herself. The body-ownership view argues that a necessary and sufficient condition on such self-ascriptions is the existence of causal links betwee...
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Universidad de La Serena/Facultad de Humanidades. Departamento de Artes y Letras.
2019
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oai:scielo:S0719-326220190002002302020-01-16First Person and Body OwnershipSanhueza Rodríguez,Sebastián first-person thought body-ownership causal links P.F. Strawson Animalism Abstract: Bodily and mental self-ascriptions are forms of first-person thought where a subject attributes physical properties and psychological states to herself. The body-ownership view argues that a necessary and sufficient condition on such self-ascriptions is the existence of causal links between a spatio-temporal body and the self-ascribed properties or states. However, since P.F. Strawson’s influential attack, this view has been dismissed as a bad philosophical idea. The goal of this brief piece is to outline the body-ownership view and neutralise two classic lines of objection against it: on the one hand, that the stance is incoherent; and, on the other, that it has counterintuitive implications.info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessUniversidad de La Serena/Facultad de Humanidades. Departamento de Artes y Letras. Logos (La Serena) v.29 n.2 20192019-12-01text/htmlhttp://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0719-32622019000200230en10.15443/rl2919 |
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English |
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first-person thought body-ownership causal links P.F. Strawson Animalism |
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first-person thought body-ownership causal links P.F. Strawson Animalism Sanhueza Rodríguez,Sebastián First Person and Body Ownership |
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Abstract: Bodily and mental self-ascriptions are forms of first-person thought where a subject attributes physical properties and psychological states to herself. The body-ownership view argues that a necessary and sufficient condition on such self-ascriptions is the existence of causal links between a spatio-temporal body and the self-ascribed properties or states. However, since P.F. Strawson’s influential attack, this view has been dismissed as a bad philosophical idea. The goal of this brief piece is to outline the body-ownership view and neutralise two classic lines of objection against it: on the one hand, that the stance is incoherent; and, on the other, that it has counterintuitive implications. |
author |
Sanhueza Rodríguez,Sebastián |
author_facet |
Sanhueza Rodríguez,Sebastián |
author_sort |
Sanhueza Rodríguez,Sebastián |
title |
First Person and Body Ownership |
title_short |
First Person and Body Ownership |
title_full |
First Person and Body Ownership |
title_fullStr |
First Person and Body Ownership |
title_full_unstemmed |
First Person and Body Ownership |
title_sort |
first person and body ownership |
publisher |
Universidad de La Serena/Facultad de Humanidades. Departamento de Artes y Letras. |
publishDate |
2019 |
url |
http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0719-32622019000200230 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT sanhuezarodriguezsebastian firstpersonandbodyownership |
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