Evolutionary games with environmental feedbacks

Strategic game payoffs often depend on the state of the environment, which in turn can be influenced by game strategies. Here, Tilman et al. develop a general framework for modeling strategic games with environmental feedbacks and analyze case studies from decision-making, ecology, and economics.

Guardado en:
Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Andrew R. Tilman, Joshua B. Plotkin, Erol Akçay
Formato: article
Lenguaje:EN
Publicado: Nature Portfolio 2020
Materias:
Q
Acceso en línea:https://doaj.org/article/3649610c51c849b688e0a5eada39ac0b
Etiquetas: Agregar Etiqueta
Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!