Evolutionary games with environmental feedbacks
Strategic game payoffs often depend on the state of the environment, which in turn can be influenced by game strategies. Here, Tilman et al. develop a general framework for modeling strategic games with environmental feedbacks and analyze case studies from decision-making, ecology, and economics.
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| Autores principales: | , , |
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| Formato: | article |
| Lenguaje: | EN |
| Publicado: |
Nature Portfolio
2020
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://doaj.org/article/3649610c51c849b688e0a5eada39ac0b |
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