Guessing Bits: Improved Lattice Attacks on (EC)DSA with Nonce Leakage
The lattice reduction attack on (EC)DSA (and other Schnorr-like signature schemes) with partially known nonces, originally due to Howgrave-Graham and Smart, has been at the core of many concrete cryptanalytic works, side-channel based or otherwise, in the past 20 years. The attack itself has seen l...
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| Auteurs principaux: | , , , |
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| Format: | article |
| Langue: | EN |
| Publié: |
Ruhr-Universität Bochum
2021
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| Accès en ligne: | https://doaj.org/article/573e14eacdef43528ea26eb8266d6124 |
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