Guessing Bits: Improved Lattice Attacks on (EC)DSA with Nonce Leakage

The lattice reduction attack on (EC)DSA (and other Schnorr-like signature schemes) with partially known nonces, originally due to Howgrave-Graham and Smart, has been at the core of many concrete cryptanalytic works, side-channel based or otherwise, in the past 20 years. The attack itself has seen l...

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Auteurs principaux: Chao Sun, Thomas Espitau, Mehdi Tibouchi, Masayuki Abe
Format: article
Langue:EN
Publié: Ruhr-Universität Bochum 2021
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Accès en ligne:https://doaj.org/article/573e14eacdef43528ea26eb8266d6124
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