ε-Constraint method for bi-objective competitive facility location problem with uncertain demand scenario

We consider a model of two parties’ competition organized as a Stackelberg game. The parties open their facilities intending to maximize profit from serving the customers that behave following a binary rule. The set of customers is unknown to the party which opens its facilities first and is called...

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Auteurs principaux: Vladimir Beresnev, Andrey Melnikov
Format: article
Langue:EN
Publié: Elsevier 2020
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Accès en ligne:https://doaj.org/article/5a6c3475e4094466af32081a07ce3a46
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