Closed-Loop Nash Equilibrium in the Class of Piecewise Constant Strategies in a Linear State Feedback Form for Stochastic LQ Games

In this paper, we examine a sampled-data Nash equilibrium strategy for a stochastic linear quadratic (LQ) differential game, in which admissible strategies are assumed to be constant on the interval between consecutive measurements. Our solution first involves transforming the problem into a linear...

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Auteurs principaux: Vasile Drăgan, Ivan Ganchev Ivanov, Ioan-Lucian Popa, Ovidiu Bagdasar
Format: article
Langue:EN
Publié: MDPI AG 2021
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Accès en ligne:https://doaj.org/article/689f5191224a4904b41f4b332aba0a1c
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