Schelling, Cavell, and the Truth of Skepticism
This paper argues that (1) McDowell wrongly assumes that “terror”, Cavell’s reaction to the radical contingency of our shared modes of knowing or our “attunement”, expresses a skepticism that is antinomically bound to an equally unacceptable dogmatism because (2) Cavell rather regards terror as a m...
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| Formato: | article |
| Lenguaje: | EN |
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MULPress
2021
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| Acceso en línea: | https://doaj.org/article/7c57a7268fc64c21bd7c6e7fe3569452 |
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| Sumario: | This paper argues that (1) McDowell wrongly assumes that “terror”, Cavell’s reaction to the radical contingency of our shared modes of knowing or our “attunement”, expresses a skepticism that is antinomically bound to an equally unacceptable dogmatism because (2) Cavell rather regards terror as a mood that reveals the “truth of skepticism”, namely, that there is no conclusive evidence for necessary attunement on pain of a category error, and that (3) a precedent for McDowell’s misunderstanding is Hegel’s argument for necessary attunement in a system of knowing, whose refutation Schelling holds it is the “merit of skepticism” to provide.
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