Schelling, Cavell, and the Truth of Skepticism
This paper argues that (1) McDowell wrongly assumes that “terror”, Cavell’s reaction to the radical contingency of our shared modes of knowing or our “attunement”, expresses a skepticism that is antinomically bound to an equally unacceptable dogmatism because (2) Cavell rather regards terror as a m...
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Autor principal: | G. Anthony Bruno |
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Formato: | article |
Lenguaje: | EN |
Publicado: |
MULPress
2021
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://doaj.org/article/7c57a7268fc64c21bd7c6e7fe3569452 |
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