Schelling, Cavell, and the Truth of Skepticism

This paper argues that (1) McDowell wrongly assumes that “terror”, Cavell’s reaction to the radical contingency of our shared modes of knowing or our “attunement”, expresses a skepticism that is antinomically bound to an equally unacceptable dogmatism because (2) Cavell rather regards terror as a m...

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteur principal: G. Anthony Bruno
Format: article
Langue:EN
Publié: MULPress 2021
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Accès en ligne:https://doaj.org/article/7c57a7268fc64c21bd7c6e7fe3569452
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