Bilevel programming methods for computing single-leader-multi-follower equilibria in normal-form and polymatrix games

The concept of leader-follower (or Stackelberg) equilibrium plays a central role in a number of real-world applications bordering on mathematical optimization and game theory. While the single-follower case has been investigated since the inception of bilevel programming with the seminal work of von...

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Autores principales: Nicola Basilico, Stefano Coniglio, Nicola Gatti, Alberto Marchesi
Formato: article
Lenguaje:EN
Publicado: Elsevier 2020
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Acceso en línea:https://doaj.org/article/9a8ae5364eaf478ba261674b4a89e202
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