Bilevel programming methods for computing single-leader-multi-follower equilibria in normal-form and polymatrix games
The concept of leader-follower (or Stackelberg) equilibrium plays a central role in a number of real-world applications bordering on mathematical optimization and game theory. While the single-follower case has been investigated since the inception of bilevel programming with the seminal work of von...
Guardado en:
Autores principales: | Nicola Basilico, Stefano Coniglio, Nicola Gatti, Alberto Marchesi |
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Formato: | article |
Lenguaje: | EN |
Publicado: |
Elsevier
2020
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://doaj.org/article/9a8ae5364eaf478ba261674b4a89e202 |
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