Impulsiveness does not prevent cooperation from emerging but reduces its occurrence: an experiment with zebra finches
Abstract Reciprocal altruism, the most probable mechanism for cooperation among unrelated individuals, can be modelled as a Prisoner’s Dilemma. This game predicts that cooperation should evolve whenever the players, who expect to interact repeatedly, make choices contingent to their partner’s behavi...
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| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | article |
| Lenguaje: | EN |
| Publicado: |
Nature Portfolio
2017
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://doaj.org/article/9b8618cd0f7a469daa3c5533fefffa99 |
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