Beyond the Cartesian Self

I review a number of approaches that attempt to deal with the gap that seems to exist between first-person and third-person accounts of consciousness, and some of the conceptual, epistemological, and methodological issues that surround this distinction. I argue, with reference to Carnap and Schrödi...

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Autor principal: Lynne Baker
Formato: article
Lenguaje:EN
FR
IT
Publicado: Rosenberg & Sellier 2016
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Acceso en línea:https://doaj.org/article/b3b32facf8d54a40b8608a988d30c884
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