Beyond the Cartesian Self

I review a number of approaches that attempt to deal with the gap that seems to exist between first-person and third-person accounts of consciousness, and some of the conceptual, epistemological, and methodological issues that surround this distinction. I argue, with reference to Carnap and Schrödi...

Descripción completa

Guardado en:

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal:	Lynne Baker
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN FR IT
Publicado:	Rosenberg & Sellier 2016
Materias:	heterophenomenology neurophenomenology first-person third-person science Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/b3b32facf8d54a40b8608a988d30c884
Etiquetas:	Agregar Etiqueta Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

id	oai:doaj.org-article:b3b32facf8d54a40b8608a988d30c884
record_format	dspace
spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:b3b32facf8d54a40b8608a988d30c8842021-12-02T10:11:07ZBeyond the Cartesian Self10.13128/Phe_Mi-196432280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/b3b32facf8d54a40b8608a988d30c8842016-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7051https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028 I review a number of approaches that attempt to deal with the gap that seems to exist between first-person and third-person accounts of consciousness, and some of the conceptual, epistemological, and methodological issues that surround this distinction. I argue, with reference to Carnap and Schrödinger, that one cannot simply reduce data from the first-person perspective to third-person data, without remainder, especially when the very subject matter of the science includes the first-person perspective. Lynne BakerRosenberg & Sellierarticleheterophenomenologyneurophenomenologyfirst-personthird-personscienceAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 1 (2016)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN FR IT
topic	heterophenomenology neurophenomenology first-person third-person science Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
spellingShingle	heterophenomenology neurophenomenology first-person third-person science Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 Lynne Baker Beyond the Cartesian Self
description	I review a number of approaches that attempt to deal with the gap that seems to exist between first-person and third-person accounts of consciousness, and some of the conceptual, epistemological, and methodological issues that surround this distinction. I argue, with reference to Carnap and Schrödinger, that one cannot simply reduce data from the first-person perspective to third-person data, without remainder, especially when the very subject matter of the science includes the first-person perspective.
format	article
author	Lynne Baker
author_facet	Lynne Baker
author_sort	Lynne Baker
title	Beyond the Cartesian Self
title_short	Beyond the Cartesian Self
title_full	Beyond the Cartesian Self
title_fullStr	Beyond the Cartesian Self
title_full_unstemmed	Beyond the Cartesian Self
title_sort	beyond the cartesian self
publisher	Rosenberg & Sellier
publishDate	2016
url	https://doaj.org/article/b3b32facf8d54a40b8608a988d30c884
work_keys_str_mv	AT lynnebaker beyondthecartesianself
_version_	1718397530381746176

Beyond the Cartesian Self

Ejemplares similares