Beyond the Cartesian Self
I review a number of approaches that attempt to deal with the gap that seems to exist between first-person and third-person accounts of consciousness, and some of the conceptual, epistemological, and methodological issues that surround this distinction. I argue, with reference to Carnap and Schrödi...
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| Main Author: | Lynne Baker |
|---|---|
| Format: | article |
| Language: | EN FR IT |
| Published: |
Rosenberg & Sellier
2016
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://doaj.org/article/b3b32facf8d54a40b8608a988d30c884 |
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