Automata representation of successful strategies for social dilemmas
Abstract In a social dilemma, cooperation is collectively optimal, yet individually each group member prefers to defect. A class of successful strategies of direct reciprocity were recently found for the iterated prisoner’s dilemma and for the iterated three-person public-goods game: By a successful...
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| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | article |
| Lenguaje: | EN |
| Publicado: |
Nature Portfolio
2020
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://doaj.org/article/f08425c2320d41a9a6b2df098af50735 |
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