Automata representation of successful strategies for social dilemmas
Abstract In a social dilemma, cooperation is collectively optimal, yet individually each group member prefers to defect. A class of successful strategies of direct reciprocity were recently found for the iterated prisoner’s dilemma and for the iterated three-person public-goods game: By a successful...
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| Auteurs principaux: | , |
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| Format: | article |
| Langue: | EN |
| Publié: |
Nature Portfolio
2020
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| Accès en ligne: | https://doaj.org/article/f08425c2320d41a9a6b2df098af50735 |
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