Automata representation of successful strategies for social dilemmas

Abstract In a social dilemma, cooperation is collectively optimal, yet individually each group member prefers to defect. A class of successful strategies of direct reciprocity were recently found for the iterated prisoner’s dilemma and for the iterated three-person public-goods game: By a successful...

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Autores principales:	Yohsuke Murase, Seung Ki Baek
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Nature Portfolio 2020
Materias:	Medicine R Science Q
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/f08425c2320d41a9a6b2df098af50735
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:f08425c2320d41a9a6b2df098af507352021-12-02T16:35:41ZAutomata representation of successful strategies for social dilemmas10.1038/s41598-020-70281-x2045-2322https://doaj.org/article/f08425c2320d41a9a6b2df098af507352020-08-01T00:00:00Zhttps://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-020-70281-xhttps://doaj.org/toc/2045-2322Abstract In a social dilemma, cooperation is collectively optimal, yet individually each group member prefers to defect. A class of successful strategies of direct reciprocity were recently found for the iterated prisoner’s dilemma and for the iterated three-person public-goods game: By a successful strategy, we mean that it constitutes a cooperative Nash equilibrium under implementation error, with assuring that the long-term payoff never becomes less than the co-players’ regardless of their strategies, when the error rate is small. Although we have a list of actions prescribed by each successful strategy, the rationale behind them has not been fully understood for the iterated public-goods game because the list has hundreds of entries to deal with every relevant history of previous interactions. In this paper, we propose a method to convert such history-based representation into an automaton with a minimal number of states. Our main finding is that a successful strategy for the iterated three-person public-goods game can be represented as a 10-state automaton by this method. In this automaton, each state can be interpreted as the player’s internal judgement of the situation, such as trustworthiness of the co-players and the need to redeem oneself after defection. This result thus suggests a comprehensible way to choose an appropriate action at each step towards cooperation based on a situational judgement, which is mapped from the history of interactions.Yohsuke MuraseSeung Ki BaekNature PortfolioarticleMedicineRScienceQENScientific Reports, Vol 10, Iss 1, Pp 1-10 (2020)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Medicine R Science Q
spellingShingle	Medicine R Science Q Yohsuke Murase Seung Ki Baek Automata representation of successful strategies for social dilemmas
description	Abstract In a social dilemma, cooperation is collectively optimal, yet individually each group member prefers to defect. A class of successful strategies of direct reciprocity were recently found for the iterated prisoner’s dilemma and for the iterated three-person public-goods game: By a successful strategy, we mean that it constitutes a cooperative Nash equilibrium under implementation error, with assuring that the long-term payoff never becomes less than the co-players’ regardless of their strategies, when the error rate is small. Although we have a list of actions prescribed by each successful strategy, the rationale behind them has not been fully understood for the iterated public-goods game because the list has hundreds of entries to deal with every relevant history of previous interactions. In this paper, we propose a method to convert such history-based representation into an automaton with a minimal number of states. Our main finding is that a successful strategy for the iterated three-person public-goods game can be represented as a 10-state automaton by this method. In this automaton, each state can be interpreted as the player’s internal judgement of the situation, such as trustworthiness of the co-players and the need to redeem oneself after defection. This result thus suggests a comprehensible way to choose an appropriate action at each step towards cooperation based on a situational judgement, which is mapped from the history of interactions.
format	article
author	Yohsuke Murase Seung Ki Baek
author_facet	Yohsuke Murase Seung Ki Baek
author_sort	Yohsuke Murase
title	Automata representation of successful strategies for social dilemmas
title_short	Automata representation of successful strategies for social dilemmas
title_full	Automata representation of successful strategies for social dilemmas
title_fullStr	Automata representation of successful strategies for social dilemmas
title_full_unstemmed	Automata representation of successful strategies for social dilemmas
title_sort	automata representation of successful strategies for social dilemmas
publisher	Nature Portfolio
publishDate	2020
url	https://doaj.org/article/f08425c2320d41a9a6b2df098af50735
work_keys_str_mv	AT yohsukemurase automatarepresentationofsuccessfulstrategiesforsocialdilemmas AT seungkibaek automatarepresentationofsuccessfulstrategiesforsocialdilemmas
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Automata representation of successful strategies for social dilemmas

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